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DWORKIN'S FALLACY, OR WHAT THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE CAN'T TEACH US ABOUT THE LAW 
Michael Steven Green* 
INTRODUCTION 
A LTHOUGH philosophers of law display an impressive di-versity of opinion, they usually agree about one thing: 
Their discipline is closely connected to the philosophy of language.' 
The extent of agreement on this point can be seen in the recent 
flood of books and articles exploring the connections between the 
two fields. 2 
• Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. Ph.D. (Philoso-
phy), Yale University, 1990; J.D., Yale Law School , 1996. I would like to thank Brian 
Bix, David Brink, Jules Coleman, Timothy Endicott, John Hasnas, Kenneth Himma, 
Hans Lindahl, Dennis Patterson, Richard Posner, and Ori Simchen for helpful com-
ments on this Essay. This Essay was written with support from George Mason Uni-
versity and its Center for Law and Economics. 
'Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 4-6, 31-37 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's 
Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 8I (I977) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously]; Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 3-21 (1996) [hereinafter 
Patterson, Law and Truth] ; Ronald Dworkin , Introduction to Philosophy of Law 1,1-
9 (Ronald Dworkin ed. , 1977) [hereinafter Dworkin , Introduction]; Brian Leiter, Why 
Quine Is Not a Postmodernist, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1739, 1739 (1997); Michael S. Moore, 
The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 
871, 872 (1989); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narra-
tive, 76 Va. L. Rev. 937, 937-40 (1990). 
2 See Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Prac-
tice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989); Andrei Marmor, Interpretation 
and Legal Theory (1992); Wittgenstein and Legal Theory (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 
1992); Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Breaking the Rules?: Wittgenstein and Legal Real-
ism, 107 Yale L.J. 1853 (1998); Brian Bix, Michael Moore's Realist Approach to Law, 
140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1992); David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, 
and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105 (1988) [hereinafter Brink, Legal Theory, 
Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review]; David 0 . Brink, Semantics and Legal In-
terpretation (Further Thoughts), 2 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 181 (1989); Stephen M. 
Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 Iowa L. 
Rev. 661 (1991); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325 (1984); Stanley Fish, 
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, 9 
Critical Inquiry 201 (1982); Stanley Fish, Wrong Again, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 299 (1983); 
Ken Kress, The Interpretive Turn , 97 Ethics 834 (1987); Sanford Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982); George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteini-
ans and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 545 (1996); Russell Pannier, 
1897 
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In this Essay, I will argue that much of this literature is based 
upon a mistake. The philosophy of language generally has no 
jurisprudential consequences. The fact that so many philoso-
phers of law have thought otherwise has seriously hampered 
progress in the field, and not just because time, effort, and paper 
have been wasted. Theories about the law have been accepted or 
rejected for the wrong reasons-on the basis of arguments about 
language that fail to support or undermine these theories at all. 
The philosophy of language appears to have jurisprudential 
consequences because of a mistake, which I will call "Dworkin's 
fallacy" in honor of the most famous philosopher of law to have 
succumbed to it. This Essay will analyze the fallacy and describe 
its negative effects. 
In Part I, I will describe an example of a debate in the phi-
losophy of language that has wrongly been thought to have 
jurisprudential consequences. This debate concerns realism 
about reference. Can words refer in ways that transcend our cur-
rent beliefs? For example, can the word "law" refer to some-
thing that people do not currently believe is law? In Part II, I 
will provide two examples of philosophers of law-Ronald 
Dworkin and Michael Moore-who misderive jurisprudential 
conclusions from this debate. 
In Part III, I will describe a second example of a debate in the 
philosophy of language that has wrongly been thought to have 
jurisprudential consequences. This debate, which is inspired by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarkable discussion of rule-following, 
concerns the fundamental question: How is it that we can intend 
D'Amato, Kripke, and Legal Indeterminacy, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 881 (2000); 
Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 325 
(2001) [hereinafter Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity]; Dennis Patterson, The 
Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 
Tex. L. Rev. l (1993); Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72 
Tex. L. Rev. 1837 (1994); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 
B.U. L. Rev. 781 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively 
Autonomous Self, 76 Geo. L.J . 37 (1987); James Seaton, Law and Literature: Works, 
Criticism, and Theory, 11 Yale. J.L. & Human. 479 (1999); Joseph William Singer, 
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1 (1984); Mark V. 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 799 n.51 (1983); Louis E . Walcher, Ronald 
Dworkin 's Right Answers Thesis Through the Lens of Wittgenstein , 29 Rutgers L.J. 
43, 47 (1997). 
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to use a word in one way rather than another? How can we 
make "law" mean law instead of, say, Nilla Wafers? In Part IV, I 
will provide two examples of philosophers of law-Dennis Pat-
terson and Margaret Radin-who misderive jurisprudential con-
clusions from this second debate. 
Although Dworkin, Moore, Patterson, and Radin agree about 
little in the philosophies of language and law, Dworkin's fallacy 
causes each to see a relationship between the two disciplines. 
Given the pervasiveness of the fallacy, we should be skeptical 
whenever a philosopher of law relies on the philosophy of lan-
guage. Chances are, she is discussing issues that are irrelevant to 
her true concerns. I will end the Essay with a brief discussion of 
three situations to which Dworkin's fallacy does not apply and in 
which the philosophy of language has genuine, if limited, rele-
vance for the philosophy of law. 
I. FIRST QUESTION: WHAT ARE OUR WORDS ABOUT? 
The first example of a debate in the philosophy of language 
that many have thought relevant to the philosophy of law con-
cerns the following question: What determines a word's refer-
ence, that is, the set of things that fall under the word? 
A. Traditional Theories 
It is traditional in the philosophy of language to identify the 
meaning of a word by the set of criteria that an individual or, 
more commonly, a linguistic community uses to determine 
whether something falls under the word. For example, the mean-. 
ing of "gold" is something like "heavy, yellow, ductile metal," 
because those are, roughly, the criteria used to determine 
whether something falls under the word "gold."3 It is this mean-
'To say that the meaning of "gold" is a particular set of criteria is to say that occur-
rences of the word "gold" could be replaced by that set without a change in meaning. 
For example, the sentence, "Gold was discovered at Summer Hill Creek in New 
South Wales, Australia on February 12, 1851," would be equivalent in meaning to the 
sentence, "A heavy, yellow, ductile metal was discovered at Summer Hill Creek in 
New South Wales, Australia on February 12, 1851." 
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ing that determines the word's reference.4 "Gold" refers to any-
thing that is, in fact, a heavy, yellow, ductile metal.5 
The traditional approach to meaning and reference is tied to es-
sential issues of philosophical method. Philosophers often analyze, 
or claim to analyze, the meanings of word~ by making explicit the 
criteria that constitute these meanings. Just as "bachelor" can be 
analyzed as "unmarried male," philosophers analyze the meanings 
of more important and controversial words, such as "freedom," 
"knowledge," and "law." This form of analysis is intended to iden-
tify not merely what the words mean, but also what must be the 
case for freedom, knowledge, or law to exist in the world-that is, 
the existence conditions for these things.6 Knowledge of existence 
conditions is analytic in the sense that it can be obtained, not 
through empirical investigation of the world, but solely through re-
flection on our knowledge of the meanings of words. The synthetic 
'See, e.g., Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, supra 
note 2, at 112-14. Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell adopt this traditional approach 
with respect to proper names. Proper names (for example, "Gottlob Frege") can be 
analyzed as definite descriptions (for example, "the sole author of the 1892 paper en-
titled 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung'"). Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Meaning, in Trans-
lations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege 56, 57-58 (Peter Geach & 
Max Black eds., 1952); Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, in Logic and Knowledge: Es-
says 1901-1950, at 39, 41 (Robert Charles Marsh ed., 1956). The definite description 
theory of names is discussed in Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word: Groundings in 
the Philosophy of Language 306-08 (1984); Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny, Language 
and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language 45--65 (2d ed. 1999); Wil-
liam G. Lycan, Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction 13-21 (2000); 
Mark de Bretton Platts, Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Lan-
guage 135-37 (2d ed. 1997). For the view that general terms (for example, "chair") are 
also disguised descriptions, see Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in 
Semantics and Modal Logic§ 4 (2d ed. 1956); J .S. Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocina-
tive and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the 
Methods of Scientific Investigation 34-41 (8th ed. 1961). The description theory of 
general terms is discussed in Devitt & Sterelny, supra, at 83-88; Lycan, supra, at 66. 
5 This means that the reference of "gold" is not rigid-the term does not refer to the 
same stuff in every possible world. For example, imagine that we were in a world in 
which some element other than gold was a heavy, yellow, ductile metal. According to 
the traditional theory, "gold" would refer to this other element. For the use of such 
examples to criticize traditional theories of reference, see Saul A. Kripke, Naming 
and Necessity 116-35 (1980); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning,' in 2 Mind, 
Language and Reality 215, 215-71 (1975) [hereinafter Putnam, The Meaning of 
'Meaning']; Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History 22-48 (1981) [hereinafter Put-
nam, Reason , Truth and History]. 
• See, e .g., Nicos Stavropoulos, Hart's Semantics, in Hart 's Postscript 59, 64 (Jules 
Coleman ed., 2001). 
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sentence "Bachelors tend not to have full sets of cookware," must 
be discovered to be true by taking a poll of bachelors. "A bachelor 
is an unmarried male," however, is true because we say it is-
because of individual or collective decisions to assign meanings to 
words.7 
Traditionalists freely admit that analytic knowledge cannot sup-
plant scientific inquiry because it cannot tell us whether existence 
conditions are actually satisfied.8 Knowing that a person must be an 
unmarried male to be a bachelor is different from knowing that any 
particular person actually is male and unmarried. Nevertheless, 
analytic knowledge is knowledge of an important type. 
Analyzing meanings does not require empirical investigation 
into the world, but that does not mean it is easy. We generally have 
only practical knowledge of the meanings of words-knowledge 
that gives us competence in the language. Having this practical 
knowledge is compatible with finding it difficult to articulate what 
this knowledge is. We may feel confident when we say that being 
unmarried and male exhaust the existence conditions of bachelor-
hood, thereby overlooking our practical knowledge that the Pope 
and two-year-old boys should not be called "bachelors." 
There is another problem that only qualifies, without undermin-
ing, the philosophical project of discovering existence conditions by 
analyzing meanings: It may be impossible to describe exhaustively 
the meaning of a word. That is, it may be impossible to come up 
with a set of conditions, each member of which is necessary and the 
totality of which is sufficient, for a thing falling under a term. In-
stead, meanings may consist of clusters of conditions, not all of 
which are necessary and no specific set of which is sufficient. The 
applicability of the word may simply be the result of the satisfac-
tion of a sufficiently large number of conditions within the cluster. 
To use Ludwig Wittgenstein's example, the standards governing 
the appropriate application of the word "game" do not appear to 
7 That analytic knowledge does not require empirical investigation of the world is 
not to say that it does not depend upon empirical inquiry of any sort. Someone ana-
lyzing meanings will have to investigate his own and others' dispositions to use words. 
Such investigation is presumably empirical in nature. 
• E.g., Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual 
Analysis 43-44 (1998). 
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be reducible to a set of necessary and sufficient criteria.9 To be 
sure, the following are relevant to whether something should be 
called a "game": specified rules, winners and losers, and enter-
tainment for the players. Yet, examples of games can be found that 
fail to have these features. 10 Tossing a ball in the air can be a game 
even though there are no specified rules; solitaire is a game even 
though it has only one player; and professional football is a game 
even though the players' primary motivation may be financial. 
Even if meanings are constituted by clusters, the project of un-
covering existence conditions by analyzing meanings can still occur, 
albeit in a more modest fashion. 11 Criteria in a cluster are still iden-
tified, not through empirical inquiry into the world, but by reflec-
tion on our knowledge of the meaning of a word. Consider our 
knowledge that being an unmarried male of marriageable age, al-
though perhaps not sufficient for bachelorhood (because the Pope 
is not a bachelor), is relevant to it. We arrive at this knowledge, the 
traditional philosopher argues, not by taking a poll of bachelors, 
but by reflecting on what the word "bachelor" means. It remains 
analytic because it can be known by anyone who has competence 
in using the word. 
One final qualification is in order. Philosophers do not com-
monly analyze the entire meaning of a word. The word "law," for 
example, can be used to refer not merely to statutes, judicial deci-
sions, and the like, but also to scientific or mathematical laws. Phi-
losophers of law generally are interested in the word "law" only as 
applied to items of the former type. 12 Indeed philosophers almost 
always examine meanings that are so fine-grained (or abstract) that 
they will fail to correspond perfectly to the meaning of any com-
monly used word. 13 In such a case, the philosopher is best under-
9 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 71, 75 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953). 
'"I d. 
11 For the cluster theory employed with respect to proper names, see P.F. Strawson, 
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics 180-83, 190-94 (1964); John R. 
Searle, Proper Names, 67 Mind 166 {1958); see also Devitt & Sterelny, supra note 4, 
at 50-54 (describing and criticizing Strawson's and Searle's approaches to proper 
names); Lycan, supra note 4, at 42-43 (describing Searle's theory). 
"See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Ori Simchen, "Law," 9 Legal Theory 1, 1 n.1 (2003). 
"See Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Com-
parison, in Hart's Postscript, supra note 6, at 1, 7-8 (expressing skepticism that any 
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stood as analyzing concepts-such as the (or a) concept of law-
rather than linguistic meanings. Nevertheless, for the traditional 
philosopher, the analysis of concepts is not significantly different 
from the analysis of meanings. What falls under the concept is de-
termined by the criteria that an individual or community uses when 
applying the concept.'4 For this reason, I speak of the traditional 
theory of the meaning (and reference) of words, even though the 
theory could apply equally to concepts. 
B. Realist Theories 
Since the 1970s, there has been a strong movement against the 
traditional theory-even in its more modest cluster form-in favor 
of theories that can be called "realist." According to these critics of 
the traditional theory, the reference of a word is not determined by 
criteria that are accepted by individuals or linguistic communities. 15 
For example, whatever criteria English speakers in the sixteenth 
century might have had concerning the word "water," the refer-
ence of the word was determined by a criterion about which they 
were completely unaware. "Water" actually referred to everything 
that had the physical structure H20. Sixteenth-century criteria for 
using the word may have led them to call stuff that was not ~0 
"water" and to refuse to call stuff that was H20 "water," but this 
made no difference to the reference of the term.16 It was the case 
then, as it is now, that "water" referred to anything that was, in 
fact, H20. 
commonly used word would have a meaning that corresponded with a concept that 
would be an interesting candidate for analysis). 
14 See id. at 6-14. 
15 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality, in Ob-
jectivity in Law and Morals 12,21 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001). 
16 For this rejection of the traditional theory with respect to proper names, see 
Kripke, supra note 5, at 91-97; Keith S. Donnellan, Proper Names and Identifying 
Descriptions, in Semantics of Natural Language 356 (Donald Davidson & Gilbert 
Harman eds., 1972). For a rejection of the traditional theory with respect to those 
general terms, such as "gold" or "tiger," that refer to natural kinds, see Kripke, supra 
note 5, at 116-35; Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning,' supra note 5, at 215-71; Put-
nam, Reason, Truth and History, supra note 5, at 22-48. Natural kind terms are gen-
eral terms "that refer to natural substances or organisms, like 'gold,' 'water,' 'molyb-
denum,' 'tiger,' and 'aardvark."' Lycan, supra note 4, at 66. Putnam appears to reject 
the traditional theory even as applied to general terms, such as "pencil," that are not 
natural kind terms. See Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning,' supra note 5, at 242-45. 
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Of course, there must be some connection between the reference 
of a word and people's beliefs about the proper use of the word. 
Even if it is true that what falls under the word "water" is deter-
mined by the underlying structure of some stuff in the world, the 
question remains which stuff is relevant, and it would be very 
strange if the relevant stuff were utterly unrelated to people's be-
liefs about how the word should be used. 17 Otherwise, what would 
keep the reference of ''water" from being determined by the struc-
ture of Nilla Wafers or some unknown liquid from a distant planet? 
The critics provide this connection by arguing that the relevant 
stuff is whatever has an appropriate causal and historical relation-
ship to the original uses of the word. 18 "Water" refers to everything 
that is H20 because the first users of "water" picked out certain 
stuff and that stuff has the natural physical structure of being 
H
2
0. 19 Although language users determine the paradigm sample 
for "water," the structure of the paradigm sample itself determines 
the set of things that falls under the word. In this sense, the world 
determines what words refer to, which is why the critics' theory can 
be called "realist." 
Inverting the traditional relationship between meaning and ref-
erence, the critics often argue that the reference of a word deter-
mines its meaning.20 "Water" meant H
2
0 for sixteenth-century 
English speakers even if they would have called some other trans-
parent, odorless, and potable liquids "water" as well. When calling 
this other stuff "water," they would be saying something false be-
17 Cf. Brie Gertler, Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability 
Arguments about the Mind, 36 Nofls 22, 29 (2002) ("[T]he subject can know, through 
reflection alone, how 'the substance instantiated by the items over there, or at any 
rate, by almost all of them' fixes the reference of her term 'gold.' Particular non-
ascriptive facts (e.g., that the items over there have atomic number 79) are relevant to 
reference only insofar as ascriptive factors render them relevant."). 
18 See Brink, supra note 15, at 22-23. 
19 This theory of general terms (and particularly natural kind terms) is discussed in 
Devitt & Sterelny, supra note 4, at 88-90; Lycan, supra note 4, at 66-68. A similar 
theory with respect to proper names is discussed in Devitt & Sterelny, supra note 4, at 
66-69; Lycan, supra note 4, at 63; Platts, supra note 4, at 133-60. 
20 E.g., Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 15; Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal 
Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall ed. 
2002), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism/ (July 15, 2002) (on file 
with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("Thus, if on the old view the 'meaning' 
of an expression (the descriptions speakers associated with it) fixed the reference of 
the expression, on the new theory, the referent fixes the meaning."). 
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cause they would be acting contrary to what their word "water" 
meant. 21 
A virtue of realism about meaning is its ability to explain how 
disagreement about the proper criteria for using a word can be 
nontrivial in nature.22 If the meaning of "gold" is determined by an 
individual's criteria for applying the word "gold," then people dis-
agreeing about the proper criteria are simply attributing different 
meanings to the same word. Their disagreement would be trivial 
since it could be resolved through simple disambiguation. We are 
all familiar with such trivial disagreements. If you claim that banks 
are where money is deposited, and I disagree, claiming that banks 
are strips of land immediately adjacent to bodies of water, our dis-
agreement can be resolved simply by recognizing that the word 
"bank" has two different meanings. Once the word is disambigu-
ated, there is nothing left about which to disagree. Not all dis-
agreement about the proper use of a word, however, seems trivial 
in this sense. 
There are three ways that traditional theories can make sense of 
nontrivial disagreement about criteria for using a word. First, even 
if two individuals agree in their practical knowledge of how to use 
a word, they can nevertheless nontrivially disagree about the 
proper description of that practical knowledge. I can disagree with 
someone who claims that "male" and "unmarried" exhaust the cri-
teria for using the word "bachelor," on the grounds that she is mis-
describing her own criteria for using the word. Like me, she would 
refuse to apply "bachelor" to the Pope and to two-year-old boys. 
Since having criteria for using a word is compatible with having 
poor knowledge of what these criteria are, there is ample room for 
21 It should be noted that the causal theory is a metasemantic theory, not a semantic 
one. It is not, for example, the theory that "water" means "anything that has the same 
structure as the first stuff pointed to in connection with the word 'water."' See Cole-
man & Simchen, supra note 12, at 18. This is not to say that such a theory could not be 
imagined. See Devitt & Sterelny, supra note 4, at 61; Kripke, supra note 5, at 88 n.38; 
Gertler, supra note 17, at 25-26. But under the causal theory, the semantic content of 
"water" is determined by what that word refers to, namely the natural kind, H20. 
The causal theory explains how a word gets the reference and thus the semantic con-
tent that it has. For a discussion of the distinction between semantic and metaseman-
tic accounts, see David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, in Themes from Kaplan 565, 573-76 
(J. Almog et al. eds., 1989); Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 12, 18. 
22 See Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, supra note 2, 
at 114-16; Brink, supra note 15, at 22. 
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nontrivial disagreement about criteria even if the traditional ap-
proach is correct.23 
Furthermore, disagreement about criteria should be distin-
guished from disagreement about whether these criteria are in fact 
satisfied. Consider two people who share criteria for the use of the 
word "lake": They both think that something should be called a 
"lake" if it is a body of still water of a certain size. When looking at 
a shimmering image at a great distance, they may disagree about 
whether it should be called a "lake" because they disagree about 
whether the evidence is sufficient to conclude that their shared cri-
teria are satisfied. One, being more wary about mirages, may con-
sider the evidence insufficient, whereas the other may consider it 
sufficient. What appears to be trivial disagreement about the 
meaning of the word "lake" is in fact nontrivial disagreement 
about evidentiary support. The latter form of disagreement is com-
patible with the traditional approach.24 
Finally, one may adhere to a communal version of the traditional 
theory, under which meaning is determined by the criteria ac-
cepted by a linguistic community-or by experts, whose authority 
on the matter is acknowledged by the members of the community.25 
In this case, disagreement between two individuals about criteria 
can be nontrivial because it can be about whose criteria line up 
with those of the linguistic community as a whole. If someone says 
that he has arthritis in his femur, I can disagree with his criteria for 
using the word "arthritis"-and legitimately refuse to accept that 
disambiguation dissolves the disagreement-because his criteria 
for the use of the word are contrary to those of the linguistic com-
munity. As far as the linguistic community is concerned, only 
joints-not bones-can have arthritis.26 
23 E.g., Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 9. 
24 E.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
25 E.g., Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 16-17 ("[A] committed criterialist [or 
traditionalist] can accommodate the phenomenon of division of linguistic labor by 
simply shifting on the issue of possession of content from individual speakers to the 
entire speech community. Thus it can still be claimed that contents are invariably ex-
tension-fixing criteria, except that it turns out that individual speakers do not typically 
grasp them. Individual speakers merely contribute in various ways to the entire lin-
guistic community's 'grasp' of contents."). 
26 See, e.g., Tyler Burge, Individualism and the Mental, 4 Midwest Stud. Phil. 73 
(1979); Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 9. 
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There remains, however, a type of disagreement concerning cri-
teria that threatens the traditional theory. Consider the disagree-
ment between Einsteinians and Newtonians over what should be 
considered mass. This disagreement was not about how to describe 
shared criteria for use of the term. Criteria were not shared-
Einsteinians used the word "mass" differently than Newtonians 
did.27 Nor could their disagreement have been resolved by appeal-
ing to the criteria accepted by the linguistic community as a whole. 
To be sure, at one time the linguistic community used Newtonian 
criteria, and later it used Einsteinian criteria. The triumph of the 
Einsteinian over the Newtonian conception of mass, however, was 
far more than a decision on the part of the linguistic community to 
change the meaning of the word "mass."28 Indeed, it appears that 
the word "mass" did not change meaning. The Newtonians simply 
got its meaning wrong, and the Einsteinians (we think) got it right. 
Even when the linguistic community was Newtonian, the minority 
that accepted the Einsteinian approach was correct about the 
proper use of the word. Meanings, it seems, are not reducible to 
the criteria accepted by individuals or linguistic communities. In-
stead, it is the world that determines what our words mean. 
The realist approach threatens the traditional project of analyz-
ing meanings, at least in connection with scientific terms. To the 
extent that the meaning of the word "water" is dependent upon the 
world, determining the existence conditions of "water" is of a piece 
with scientific inquiry generally. Once we have engaged in this in-
quiry, we are free to say that the existence condition of water is 
having the composition ~0, but it becomes unclear in what sense 
we are doing anything but articulating, in an abstract way, certain 
scientific truths. We do not make certain sentences true by conven-
tion or agreement. 
Of course, much more can be said about this battle, and I do not 
want to argue, or even suggest, that the realists have won it.29 My 
27 For the same reason, it was not a disagreement about whether the evidence was 
sufficient to show that shared criteria were satisfied. 
28 See Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, supra note 2, 
at 114-16; see also MichaelS. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 277,293-300 (1985) (criticizing the traditional theory of meaning). 
29 After all, the more meanings outstrip what we actually do with our words, the less 
inclined we are to think that they are the meanings of our words. Who knows where 
investigation of the physical structure of our world may take us? We may find out that 
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purpose here is solely to identify the debate between realists and 
traditionalists in order to explore its ramifications for the philoso-
phy of law. 
C. Interpretive Theories 
A prominent example of someone who thinks the debate does 
have such ramifications is Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin employs ar-
guments about meaning similar to those of the realists in order to 
attack the jurisprudential position that the law is exhausted by 
agreement or convention. In this Section, I discuss only Dworkin's 
views about meaning, saving what he thinks are the jurisprudential 
consequences of these views for Part II. 
Dworkin begins his book, Law's Empire, by noting that there are 
two ways in which lawyers and judges might disagree about the 
truth of a proposition of law. They might agree about the 
grounds of law-about when the truth or falsity of other, more 
familiar propositions makes a particular proposition of law true 
or false-but disagree about whether those grounds are in fact 
satisfied in a particular case .... Or they might disagree about 
the grounds of law, about which other kinds of propositions, 
when true, make a particular proposition of law true. 30 
The first type of disagreement is not a problem for the traditional-
ist, as we have seen, because agreement about criteria for the use 
of the word "law" is compatible with disagreement about whether 
the evidence is sufficient to conclude that the criteria have been 
satisfied. 
For the traditionalist, however, the second form of disagreement 
is problematic because it suggests that people are simply attribut-
ing different meanings to the word "law." The proper response 
much less or much more than what we currently call "water" has the same physical 
structure as our paradigm sample of water. Must we therefore admit the possibility 
that the oceans are not composed of water or that the sun is? The realist approach, in 
short, may be too successful in divorcing meaning from the criteria that we actually 
make use of when speaking. Cf. Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 36 n.43 
("[S]peakers cannot be plausibly ascribed [an intention to refer to anything having the 
same structure as some paradigm sample] because it requires attributing to them a 
robust metaphysical notion that is simply not likely to be part of their conceptual rep-
ertoire."). 
"'Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
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should be disambiguation. Dworkin names this problem for the 
traditionalist the "semantic sting."31 The traditionalist is forced to 
treat such disagreement as trivial.32 Those disagreeing "are only 
talking past one another. Their arguments are pointless ... like an 
argument about banks when one has in mind savings banks and the 
other riverbanks. "33 Yet, Dworkin argues, these disagreements do 
not feel trivial-indeed, their resolution seems vitally important.34 
The semantic sting is just as much a problem for the traditional-
ist if she claims to be analyzing a concept of law rather than the 
meaning of the word "law." Under the traditional approach, a con-
cept's content is likewise determined by currently accepted criteria 
for applying the concept. This means that people who disagree 
about criteria are simply using different concepts, once again mak-
ing their disagreement trivial. 
We know that Dworkin thinks traditional theories of meaning 
are mistaken because he believes that the meaning of a word can 
be determinate and stable even if there is significant disagreement 
and changing beliefs concerning the proper criteria for the word's 
application.35 Dworkin is not as forthcoming, however, about what 
he thinks the replacement for the traditional theory should be. One 
might expect him to conclude, in realist fashion, that meaning is de-
termined by the reference of a word and that reference is fixed by 
the underlying essential structure of the stuff that people were 
pointing to when they first used the word. But Dworkin avoids 
such an approach, apparently because he worries about the intelli-
" ld. at 45-46. 
32 ld. 
33 ld. at 44. 
34 ld . at 46 (arguing that theoretical disagreements in the law are "genuine"). Of 
course, it remains possible that people share criteria for using the word " law" but 
simply disagree about the proper descriptions of these criteria. As we have seen, hav-
ing practical knowledge of the meaning of a word is one thing, articulating it is an-
other. ld. at 32. To show that people genuinely disagree about criteria for using the 
word "law," Dworkin must show not merely that people disagree about how these cri-
teria should be described, but also that they disagree about what they actually call 
" law." Furthermore, because the traditional approach can take a communal form, 
Dworkin must show that the disagreement is not simply the result of an idiosyncratic 
individual using the word in a way that diverges from the criteria of the linguistic 
community. Let us assume, with Dworkin, that nontrivial disagreements about the use 
of the word "law" can be found that satisfy all these conditions. 
35 See, e.g., Dworkin , Introduction, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
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gibility of talk about metaphysically real entities with underlying 
structures that could fix this reference.36 
For example, Dworkin rejects metaphysical realism in connec-
tion with moral terms as "archimedean," a theoretical approach 
that "purport[s] to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to 
judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to 
it. "37 Although we are committed to the view that moral terms refer 
to qualities that are independent of our attitudes,38 this commit-
ment arises from and is dependent upon our attitudes themselves.39 
At the same time, Dworkin insists that differing attitudes concern-
ing the proper use of a moral term do not mean that there is no fact 
of the matter about whether a term is appropriately applied. 40 
Dworkin's theory of meaning must therefore be one in which the 
proper application of a word both is immanent to and transcends 
our current beliefs. How is this possible? 
We can begin to answer this question by considering logic, where 
there are similar concerns about both traditionalism and meta-
physical realism. Consider the following rule of deduction:41 
If all As are Band xis an A, then xis B. 
This rule allows us to conclude that Dumbo is a mammal from 
the truth of, "All elephants are mammals" and, "Dumbo is an ele-
phant." Yet how do we know that this rule is correct? Since the va-
lidity of the rule seems to depend upon the meanings of the terms 
"" Cf. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 80--86 (denying the relevance of 
metaphysical realism about morality); Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish 
(and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Any More, in The 
Politics of Interpretation 287, 291-92 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983) (rejecting realism 
with respect to literary meanings); id. at 297-301 (rejecting realism with respect to 
morality) . A good discussion of Dworkin 's views in this area can be found in Moore, 
supra note 1, at 949-51. 
For an argument that the causal-historical account of reference, properly under-
stood, does not suffer from the problems of metaphysical realism, see Coleman & 
Simchen, supra note 12, at 36 n.43 . 
" Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 87, 88 (1996). 
:\8 Id . at 97. 
" Dworkin , Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 76-86; Dworkin, supra note 37, at 99. 
40 Dworkin, supra note 37, at 107-08. 
" A rule of deduction is a rule according to which the conclusion must be true if the 
premises are true. 
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"all" and "if ... then," one possibility is to argue, in traditional 
fashion, that its validity is simply the result of individual or collec-
tive decisions to attribute certain meanings to these terms. We 
simply define the terms such that inferences of this sort are valid 
ones. 
But whoever adopts such an approach would fall prey to the se-
mantic sting. Disagreements over which deductive rules are correct 
would become trivial since they could be dissolved through simple 
disambiguation of the terms "all" and "if ... then." Furthermore, 
reform of our deductive practices in light of rules of deduction 
would not actually be reform at all: It would simply be the choice 
to replace one set of meanings for "all" and "if ... then" with an-
other. 
Another option is to adopt a metaphysically realist approach, 
under which there is something standing outside of our uses of 
"all" and "if ... then" that determines their meanings-and, thus, 
which rules of deduction are valid. This approach, however, means 
postulating the existence of strange Platonic entities, allness and 
if ... thenness, that do not fit well into our standard scientific de-
scriptions of the world. 
The philosopher Nelson Goodman's resolution of this problem 
avoids both traditionalism and metaphysical realism.42 Rules of de-
ductive inference are justified in light of our deductive practices 
themselves.43 As Goodman himself notes, "[t]his looks flagrantly 
circular."44 Valid rules are supposed to reform our deductive prac-
tices. How can they do that if they are dependent upon our prac-
tices? Goodman responds that the "circle is a virtuous one": 
The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified 
by being brought into agreement with each other. A rule is 
amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an 
inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to 
amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making 
42 Goodman discussed the problem of how we can arrive at valid rules of deductive 
inference in order to get a clearer picture of his primary topic: How we can arrive at 
valid rules of inductive inference-those rules that identify inferences under which 
the truth of the premises merely make the conclusion more probable. Nelson Good-
man, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (4th ed. 1983). 
43 Id. at 63. 
44 Id. at 64. 
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1912 2003
1912 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1897 
mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and 
in the agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for 
either.45 
When suggesting candidates for rules of deduction, we draw 
upon our prereflective deductive practices-that is, our common 
tendencies to make certain deductive inferences rather than others. 
No rule of deduction will be accepted as a candidate unless it is 
largely in accord with these practices. 1n this sense, reform is im-
manent to the practice itself. On the other hand, the reflective 
process of creating rules of deduction can provide us with a critical 
perspective on our deductive practices that will allow us to reform 
them. Having established rules of deduction, we may find that in 
certain cases our deductive practices are wrong. Our deductive 
practices are not reformed through contact with metaphysically 
real allness or if ... thenness, but through the critically reflective 
character of our deductive practices themselves. 
That this process is critically reflective explains why we do not 
conclude from the fact that our practices have been reformed that 
we have chosen to redefine terms like "all" or "if ... then." We can 
say that the meanings of "all" and "if ... then" are the same, de-
spite changes in our practices of using these terms. This is because 
the changes are the products of critical reflection on the practices 
themselves, manifesting limitations within the practices that were 
not recognized at the time. 
In his Theory of Justice, John Rawls, citing Goodman, uses the 
term "reflective equilibrium" for the analogous process of reaching 
a compromise between principles of justice and our prereflective 
practice of calling particular acts or institutions "just" and "un-
just."46 Once again, this approach navigates a course between the 
Scylla of a metaphysical realism about justice and the Charybdis of 
a traditional approach, under which any change in our criteria for 
using the word "just" becomes a trivial decision to give the word 
"just" a different meaning. 
Goodman and Rawls refuse to rely upon a metaphysically realist 
explanation of theoretical development in their disciplines-that is, 
an appeal to our growing knowledge of the underlying nature of 
•s I d. 
'
6 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 17-18, 18 n.7 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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logic-stuff and justice-stuff-because of the difficulty of figuring 
out just what this stuff is, and how, if it did exist, its underlying na-
ture might constrain our linguistic practices. My purpose here is 
not to show that they were right. Platonism in logic may be a viable 
option. So may moral realism, which treats moral qualities like 
justness as existing, in some metaphysically strong sense, inde-
pendently of human beings and their attitudes.47 
Conversely, it may be that we have to use reflective equilibrium 
to explain continuity of meaning concerning scientific terms like 
"water." If it is impossible to explain how the underlying structure 
of water can guide our practice of using the word-because any re-
sponse to this underlying structure will always be determined by 
the prereflective commitments of that practice itself-what appears 
to be scientific inquiry into the nature of water instead may be re-
flective equilibrium.48 We can say that we have discovered the na-
ture of water, but this may be no different from discovering the na-
ture of justice or the correct rules of logic. It may be a reformation 
of our practices of using the word "water" in the context of those 
practices themselves. Our insistence that meaning is constant de-
spite changes in our linguistic practices may have no more meta-
physically realist implications in the case of the word "water" than 
it does in the case of the word "just" or "all." I do not mean to sug-
gest that this theory of critical reflection should be applied to scien-
tific terms. My point is only that it has the potential to incorporate 
realist intuitions about continuity of meaning within an otherwise 
anti-realist framework. 
Because Dworkin eschews both traditionalism (as evidenced by 
his semantic sting argument) and metaphysical realism (as evi-
denced by his rejection of archimedeanism), his theory of meaning 
must be similar to the theory that I have outlined above. 49 A word 
will have constancy and determinacy of meaning, despite changes 
and disagreement concerning the criteria for its use, because the 
47 See, e.g., Essays on Moral Realism (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); Michael 
S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2424 (1992). 
48 It is unclear whether Dworkin wants to adopt an interpretive approach with re-
spect to scientific concepts. See Moore, supra note 1, at 943 & nn.299-300. 
49 Michael S. Moore attributes a similar theory of meaning to Dworkin in Law as a 
Functional Kind, in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 188, 220--21 (Robert 
P. George ed. , 1992). 
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practice of using the word evolves through critical reflection, which 
reforms it in light of its prereflective commitments. The meaning of 
the word remains the same despite changes in the practice of its 
use because critical reflection manifests limitations that were, in a 
sense, always binding the participants. Let us call this theory of 
meaning "interpretive. "50 
One might think it is a mistake to attribute to Dworkin any the-
ory of the meaning of words, given that he distinguishes his own 
positions from the "semantic" approaches of his opponents. 51 In 
fact, Dworkin objects only to approaches in which the meaning of 
words is determined by currently accepted criteria for use. He un-
derstands a "semantic" approach as one that identifies "linguistic 
ground rules everyone must follow to make sense. "52 An interpre-
tive theory of meaning, which denies that meaning is determined 
by such linguistic ground rules, is not "semantic" in this sense. In-
deed, Dworkin cannot deny that he has semantic views, since the 
50 Although there is little in Dworkin's writings that can help us decide the matter, 
the interpretive theory of meaning is probably a metasemantic theory in the sense 
that it specifies how the semantic content of words is determined, not what their con-
tent is. The content of the word "law" is not "whatever criteria for using the word 
'law' will result from critical reflection." The content is instead the actual set of crite-
ria for using the word "law" that will be arrived at through critical reflection. 
Jules Coleman and Ori Simchen have noted a further ambiguity in my account of 
the interpretive theory of meaning. E-mail from Jules L. Coleman, Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of Philosophy, Yale Law School to 
Michael Green, Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law (July 6, 
2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Is the meaning of a term 
whatever results from the interpretive process that actually occurs or the interpretive 
process as it should occur (ideally) but may not? For example, if some nuclear acci-
dent halts the process of interpretation for us all, does it follow that the meanings of 
our words are (and always were) limited to the level of development at the moment of 
the accident? As an expositor of Dworkin, I am inclined toward the first approach, 
since Dworkin himself tends to speak of actual rather than ideal processes of interpre-
tation. E.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 71. But I am afraid that I must 
leave this issue-as well as many others-unanswered. 
The goal of this Essay is to show that theories of meaning, such as Dworkin's inter-
pretivism, cannot generate jurisprudential conclusions. To make my argument, I must 
provide some account of what these theories, including Dworkin's interpretivism, are. 
It is not necessary to give a complete account, however, much less one that would an-
swer all possible objections-especially since I strongly suspect that many of the ob-
jections to Dworkin's theory cannot be answered. 
5
' See Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 46, 71. 
52 I d. at 71. 
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semantic sting argument itself embodies a semantic view-namely 
an antitraditional one.53 
I therefore conclude that Dworkin uses an interpretive theory of 
meaning to account for realist intuitions about the meaning of the 
word "law." The meaning of the word "law" can be determinate 
and stable even when people disagree about the proper criteria for 
using the word and the conventions concerning its proper use 
change, because the word's current meaning is determined by fu-
ture critical reflection on its appropriate use. 
II. DOES THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION MA ITER TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW? 
We can now address the essential question of this Essay: Assum-
ing that Dworkin's interpretive theory of meaning is correct, do 
any interesting jurisprudential conclusions follow? Do we learn 
something about the law? 
A. Dworkin's Fallacy 
Dworkin himself believes we do. Most notably, he argues that 
the failure of the traditional theory of meaning (under which the 
meaning of the word "law" is exhausted by agreement) is a power-
ful objection to jurisprudential conventionalism (under which the 
law is exhausted by agreement).54 This, as we shall see, is an exam-
ple of Dworkin's fallacy. But Dworkin goes further. He also takes 
the failure of the traditional theory of meaning as a reason to ac-
"To be sure, Dworkin generally speaks of the process of interpretation as elaborat-
ing concepts (such as the concepts of law, courtesy, or justice) rather than linguistic 
meanings. See id. at 71, 92. Nevertheless, just as the traditional approach made the 
content of both linguistic meanings and concepts a question of currently accepted cri-
teria, so too will the interpretive approach make the content of both linguistic mean-
ings and concepts a question of interpretive elaboration. If a linguistic meaning cap-
tures an interpretive concept, there is no reason that interpretation will not elaborate 
the linguistic meaning as well as the concept. Raz, supra note 13, at 12. Indeed, 
Dworkin must hold an interpretive theory of the meaning of words. If the scope of 
our concepts were determined by interpretation and the scope of the meanings of our 
words were not, we would be unable to express our thoughts to one another in lan-
guage. In what follows, I will speak of Dworkin's interpretive theory of meaning, even 
though my argument would apply equally to his interpretive theory of concepts. 
54 Dworkin, Introduction, supra note 1, at 8; Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, 
at 6-11, 31-43; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 1, at 81. 
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cept his interpretive theory of the law.55 For Dworkin, the failure of 
the traditional theory of meaning indicates that the practice of us-
ing the word "law" must have the capacity to reform itself criti-
cally. This capacity is what allows the word "law" to have a stable 
and determinate meaning. Dworkin then associates this critically 
reflective linguistic practice with the legal practices that are the 
subject matter of jurisprudence. The result is Dworkin's interpre-
tive jurisprudence, in which critical reflection on legal practices 
gives the law stability and determinacy. 
According to Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence, the law con-
sists of the set of norms that would be accepted after a process in 
which "the interpreter settles on some general justification for the 
main elements of (legal] practice" and then reforms it by "ad-
just(ing] his sense of what the practice 'really' requires so as better 
to serve the justification."56 This adjustment is like reflective equi-
librium: It is neither metaphysically realist (a response to a goal or 
norm standing outside of legal practice as a whole), nor conven-
tionalist (an arbitrary decision to change the legal practice, creating 
a rupture in its continuity). Since it is like reflective equilibrium, 
there are pre-existing answers to hard cases faced by judges, de-
spite disagreement among judges about how these cases should be 
decided. 57 This is because critical reflection on legal practices re-
veals pre-existing law, just as critical reflection on linguistic prac-
tices reveals pre-existing meaning. 
Dworkin is wrong, however, to see a connection between theo-
ries of meaning and theories of law. The failure of the traditional 
theory of meaning and the success of the interpretive alternative 
give us no reason to reject conventionalism or to accept 
interpretivism in jurisprudence.58 
This fact is best seen by considering words other than "law." Let 
us assume that the interpretive theory of meaning is true of scien-
;; See, e.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 87 ("We have drawn the se-
mantic sting and no longer need the caricature of legal practice offered in semantic 
theories. We can see more clearly now, and this is what we see. Law is an interpretive 
concept like courtesy .... "). 
'
6 ld. at 66. 
;, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 1, at 68-69. 
;s Similar criticisms of Dworkin can be found in Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of 
Principle: 1n Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 180-83 (2001); Ken-
neth Einar Himma, Ambiguously Stung, 8 Legal Theory 145, 160-65 (2002). 
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tific terms like "gold." That would mean that the proper standards 
for using the word "gold" are those that would result from critical 
reflection upon our practice of calling things "gold." This critical 
reflection can reveal standards that, although only latent within the 
linguistic practice, have always been binding upon its members. If 
such a view is correct, there could be a pre-existing answer to the 
question of whether something should be called "gold," even if 
there is currently fundamental disagreement about what should be 
called "gold." 
Nevertheless, it would be absurd to conclude from the fact that 
the meaning of "gold" is fixed by an interpretive practice that gold 
is an interpretive practice-rather than, say, a heavy, yellow, duc-
tile metal. If the interpretive theory of meaning is correct, one de-
termines what should be called "gold" by participating in the inter-
pretive practice of using the word "gold." And, at this point, such 
participation involves calling heavy, yellow, ductile metals-not in-
terpretive practices-" gold." 
Now consider the term "convention." An example of a conven-
tion is members of a group going to the central clock at Grand 
Central Station when separated during a visit to New York City, 
even though they had not agreed upon a place to meet under such 
circumstances. The central clock at Grand Central Station is the 
appropriate place to meet only because of convergence of belief: It 
is only because each member thinks of it as the appropriate place 
to meet-and knows that the others do as well-that it is the ap-
propriate place to meet. To the extent that there is disagreement 
about the place to meet, there is no appropriate place to meet-
and so no convention-at all.59 
The interpretive theory of meaning can apply just as easily to 
"convention" as it can to "gold" or "law." If it does, then the mere 
fact that we all currently agree that something should be called a 
"convention" would not be a sufficient reason to think it is indeed 
a convention. We could be wrong about what conventions are and 
reform our use of the term "convention" as a result, all the while 
preserving its meaning. In short, the practice of using the term 
59 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 55 (1960). For an analysis of 
conventions and games of coordination, see David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philoso-
phical Study 5-82 (1969). 
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"convention" would not be a convention. Instead it would be inter-
pretive-the standards for applying "convention" would be those 
that result from our critical reflection on our practice of using the 
term. 
Nevertheless, it would be absurd to conclude from this that con-
ventions are not conventions-that norms of conventions can be 
binding upon participants even when there is disagreement. If the 
interpretive theory of meaning is correct, one can figure out what 
should be called "convention" only by participating in the interpre-
tive practice of using the term "convention." Such participation in-
volves calling practices "conventions" only when and to the extent 
that there is agreement, without looking to norms of those prac-
tices that might arise later through critical reflection. 
To be sure, the practice of using the term "convention" can be 
transformed through critical reflection. It is highly unlikely, how-
ever, that the practice will be transformed to such an extent that 
conventions will turn out not to be conventional. Because critical 
reflection is undertaken from the perspective of the prereflective 
commitments of the linguistic practice itself, any change in our 
conception of conventions is likely to be far less radical. 
Using the interpretive theory of meaning to justify an interpre-
tive theory of the law is no less a mistake than using it to derive an 
interpretive theory of gold or conventions. Yet that is exactly what 
Dworkin does. Let us call this mistake "Dworkin's fallacy." 
Could Dworkin escape this fallacy by denying that he holds an 
interpretive theory of meaning or that he sees any connection be-
tween such a theory and his jurisprudential views? After all, it took 
a good deal of interpretation on my part to draw an interpretive 
theory of meaning out of Dworkin's work. 60 The law, Dworkin 
might argue, is interpretive, not because a theory of the meaning of 
the word "law" tells us so, but because independent evidence 
shows that legal practices do in fact reform themselves through 
critical reflection in a manner that reveals pre-existing law. 
If this is Dworkin's argument, the semantic sting has no place 
within it. The purpose of the sting is to show that the traditional 
60 Furthermore, when Dworkin uses the word "interpretation," he generally uses it 
only in the narrow sense of critically assessing and reforming social practices. Indeed, 
he distinguished interpretation in this sense from reflective equilibrium. See, e.g., 
Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 424 n.17. 
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theory of meaning, in particular as applied to the word "law," is 
false. If Dworkin believes that theories of meaning have no juris-
prudential consequences, why does he discuss the semantic sting in 
the first place? Dworkin can escape his fallacy only by arguing, 
contrary to all appearances, that the semantic sting is irrelevant to 
his real concerns. 
B. Linguistic and Legal Practices Distinguished 
Dworkin succumbed to his fallacy because he failed to distin-
guish between linguistic practices concerning our use of the word 
"law" and legal practices, such as adjudicating hard cases. If lin-
guistic practices are interpretive, there are norms governing our 
use of words (norms that are part of their meanings) that go be-
yond current agreement about how the words should be used. As 
the example of "convention" shows, however, simply because the 
norms for using a word that applies to a practice outstrip current 
agreement, it does not follow that the norms of the practice out-
strip current agreement. 
In short, Dworkin's fallacy depends upon confusing the practice 
of describing a practice with the practice described. Therefore, it 
cannot take hold with respect to the term "gold." There is no 
chance of confusing the practice of using the word "gold" with 
gold-gold is a heavy, yellow, ductile metal and not a practice. 
Dworkin's fallacy has a slightly easier time taking hold with respect 
to the term "convention," since conventions are at least practices. 
The fact that they are clearly conventional, however, makes it hard 
to confuse them with the potentially nonconventional practice of 
using the term "convention." 
Dworkin's fallacy is very tempting with respect to a word like 
"law," however, because legal practices may indeed be as noncon-
ventional as the practice of describing them. It may be that the 
norms of legal practices are binding upon their members even be-
fore they are revealed through critical reflection on the practices. 
Yet, if legal practices are interpretive, the interpretive character of 
the linguistic practice of using the word "law" is not the reason. 
The interpretive theory of meaning gives us no reason to accept in-
terpretive jurisprudence. 
If the interpretive theory of meaning is true of the word "law," 
we can figure out which norms should be called "law" only by par-
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ticipating in the interpretive practice of using that word. The result 
of such participation could be the conclusion that "law" is akin to 
"pre-existing norms revealed through critical reflection," as 
Dworkin believes. But it could also be something more akin to 
"norms currently accepted by participants," as the conventionalist 
believes; or "norms the violation of which are likely to lead to sanc-
tions," as the American legal realists may have believed;6' or 
"norms that satisfy independent moral requirements," as classical 
natural law theorists believe.62 
Whether interpretive jurisprudence, conventionalism, legal real-
ism, or natural law theory will be the result of critical reflection on 
our practice of using the word "law" is the big question in the phi-
losophy of law. It is not my goal to address that issue here. What 
we do know, however, is that Dworkin's interpretive theory of 
meaning does nothing to answer the big question, for all of the an-
swers to the big question are compatible with his theory.63 Indeed, 
61 For an argument that legal realists were in fact conventionalists, see Brian Leiter, 
Lepal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 Ethics 278 (2001). 
6 E.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 363-64 (1980) (discussing the 
Thomist position that "an unjust law is not law in the focal sense of the term 'law"'). 
Although Dworkin's jurisprudence can be thought of as a form of natural law theory, 
because conformity with moral requirements is a condition for law, the relevant moral 
requirements are those that can be drawn out of legal practices themselves through 
critical reflection. For the classical natural law theorist as I understand him, the rele-
vant moral requirements for law are not limited in this fashion. See Coleman, supra 
note 58, at 158-59. 
6
' It might appear as if Dworkin accepts that legal conventionalism can be the result 
of interpretive reflection on the practice of using the word " law." Even after rejecting 
conventionalist theories of the meaning of the word "law," he spends a good deal of 
time in Law's Empire offering an argument against another form of conventional-
ism-that is, the view that the scope of the law should be limited to currently accepted 
norms. 
This form of conventionalism, however, is a species of interpretive jurisprudence. 
The argument in its favor is that, after reflecting critically upon the underlying moral 
purposes of legal practices, the norms that should be called "law" are best limited to 
those that are currently accepted, because it is part of the moral purpose of these 
practices that people's settled expectations should not be upset. Dworkin, Law's Em-
pire, supra note 1, at 117-20. Although he argues against such conventionalism, id. at 
114-50, it is still an interpretive jurisprudential approach, since the only reason legal 
norms do not exceed shared expectations is that moral reflection on legal practices 
leads to such a conclusion. 
Dworkin in effect offers us only two forms of conventionalism-one that is a theory 
of meaning and one that is a form of interpretive jurisprudence. But there is a third 
alternative that he ignores: one that is interpretive as a theory of meaning but conven-
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all of the answers to the big question, including Dworkin's own in-
terpretive jurisprudence, are compatible with Dworkin's interpre-
tive theory of meaning being false. Let us assume that the meaning 
of the word "law" is fixed by currently accepted criteria for using 
the word. It could follow from these criteria that norms should be 
called "law" if they result from critical moral reflection on legal 
practices. Although our theory of meaning would be conventional-
ist, our jurisprudence would be interpretive. 
Finally, let us assume that independent evidence (for example, 
about what goes on in the adjudication of hard cases) shows that 
legal practices are interpretive. That is, let us assume that the par-
ticipants in these practices do indeed reform them critically in light 
of their fundamental moral commitments. It still does not follow 
that the word "law" refers to those sets of norms that are revealed 
through such interpretation. Language is flexible; there is no rea-
son that a word that applies to an interpretive practice must cap-
ture all of those norms that will be recognized in the unfolding of 
the practice. The word may capture only a subset of those norms. 
Conventionalist philosophers of law think that "law" is precisely 
such a word. It refers only to those norms that are currently ac-
cepted by participants in legal practices. Nothing about the inter-
pretive theory of meaning can prove them wrong, even when this 
theory is combined with the insight that legal practices unfold in-
terpretively. 
Consider an American judge who decides hard cases by reflect-
ing upon the underlying moral purposes of American legal prac-
tices in a Dworkinian manner. Let us concede that the norms that 
she arrives at through critical reflection were binding upon her and 
other participants in the practice even before she recognized them. 
It does not follow that she or anyone else should call these norms 
"law." When determining what she should call "law," the judge 
participates in the linguistic practice of using the word "law." It is 
the critically reflective unfolding of this practice that determines 
the standards for using the word "law." Rather than being called 
"law," Dworkin's interpretive norms might instead be properly 
tionalist jurisprudentially. This third form of conventionalism concludes that the law 
is limited to norms that are currently accepted, not because critical moral reflection 
on legal practices suggests this, but because the critical unfolding of the practice of 
using the word "law" suggests this. 
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called something like "the morality of the legal practice." If so, 
then no matter how interpretive legal practices are, no norm would 
be law until it is actually accepted by judges and other officials. Ad-
judication in hard cases would be an act of legislation rather than 
discovery.64 
C. Adjudication is a Legal Rather Than a Linguistic Practice 
A voiding Dworkin's fallacy means resolutely distinguishing be-
tween the linguistic practice of using the word "law" and legal 
practices. The two types of practice are different in many respects. 
For example, all English speakers, potentially, can participate in 
the practice of using the word "law." (Indeed, the practice of 
applying the concept of law is even broader, potentially allowing 
for the participation of all rational beings.65) The participants in this 
linguistic practice, however, can fail to participate in any legal prac-
tice at all, either because they live in conditions of anarchy (and 
use the word "law" to describe what they so desperately need) or 
because they are civilians, and the relevant legal practices involve 
officials only. Furthermore, even when people participate in both 
the linguistic and legal practices, the legal practices will differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, while the linguistic practice usually will 
not. English speakers can participate in the legal practices of many 
countries while still participating in the same linguistic practice of 
using the word "law." 
The real temptation to lapse into Dworkin's fallacy is provided 
by adjudication. Adjudication can look like a linguistic practice be-
cause it concerns when the word "law" should be applied to a 
norm. After all, when a judge resolves a hard case, she will call the 
norm that resolved it "law." But adjudication is in fact a legal prac-
tice in the sense that it varies in its character from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. It also involves far more than simply applying a word: 
64 See Coleman, supra note 58, at 170-71. 
6
j For examples of a comprehensive conception of a linguistic community, which in-
cludes all people whose language we could ever understand, see Jonathan Lear, The 
Disappearing "We," in 58 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume LVIII 219 (D.R. Sainsbury ed., 1984); Jonathan Lear, Transcendental An-
thropology, in Subject, Thought and Context 267 (Philip Pettit & John McDowell 
eds., 1986); Bernard Williams, Wittgenstein and Idealism, in Moral Luck: Philosophi-
cal Papers 1973-1980, at 144, 144-63 (1981). 
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When a judge calls a norm "law," she backs it up with the coercive 
force of the state. The legal practice of adjudication is intimately 
linked to the exercise of power. In contrast, when a member of the 
linguistic community uses the word "law," there is no essential 
connection to the state's coercive power at all. 
Dworkin's interpretive theory of law follows unproblematically 
from the interpretive theory of meaning once adjudication is mis-
understood as a linguistic practice. Assume with Dworkin that, 
when adjudicating, judges determine whether something should be 
called "law" interpretively, coming to their conclusions by critically 
reflecting upon the practice of adjudication itself. If this practice is 
linguistic, then it should follow from the interpretive theory of 
meaning that whatever they call "law" was the law before they ar-
ticulated it. 
Despite the fact that the practice of adjudication involves calling 
certain norms "law," however, it is not the linguistic practice gov-
erning the proper use of the word "law." As strange as it may 
sound at first, that judges or other officials have a practice of call-
ing certain norms "law" is irrelevant as to whether the norms are 
properly called "law." With the possible exception of French, the 
meanings of words, and thus the question of whether they are ap-
propriately or inappropriately applied, are not decided by authori-
ties.66 
Assume that a linguistic community, through critical reflection, 
accepts the natural law view that something should not be called 
"law" unless it meets certain independent moral requirements. 67 
Now assume that judges in a certain jurisdiction call the resolution 
of hard cases "law," but their resolutions are contrary to the moral 
requirements. If the interpretive theory of meaning is correct, then 
the judges would simply be wrong about what the law is. Their use 
of the word "law" would be deviant. 
66 The potential authority in the case of the French language is, of course, the 
Academie Fran~aise. See Maurice Druon, Preface a Ia Neuvieme Edition to Diction-
naire de L'Academie Fran~aise Tome 1 (9th ed. 1992); Harold F. Schiffman, Linguis-
tic Culture and Language Policy 85-89 (1996); Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, 
Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 285, 299-301 
(1996). 
67 These moral requirements, I hasten to add, are binding even when they cannot be 
derived through critical reflection upon legal practices. 
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Conversely, assume that a linguistic community, through critical 
reflection, comes to the conclusion that Dworkin's interpretive 
theory of law is correct. Now assume that our judges insist that 
resolutions of hard cases are not the law until they are articulated. 
Once again, they would be wrong. Their use of the word "law" 
would be deviant. 
That judges' practice of calling certain norms "law" when adju-
dicating seems to decide what should be called "law" is simply a 
consequence of the fact that all of us, as participants in a linguistic 
community, have come to the conclusion that judges calling norms 
"law" is a sufficient reason to call those norms "law." 
In short, even though some legal practices involve decisions to 
use the word "law," they are not the linguistic practices that will 
determine what should be called "law." This reasoning applies 
even when legal practices expand to the point that they include 
everyone within a country. The fact that everyone in the United 
States calls certain norms "law" is not the fundamental reason they 
are the law. It is not up to the citizens of the United States to de-
termine what law exists within its borders. Instead, their practice of 
calling certain norms "law" is relevant to whether these norms 
should be called "law" only because we, as participants in a linguis-
tic community that potentially includes all English speakers, have 
come to the conclusion that something is the law (of a jurisdiction) 
only if its citizens say it is. 
If legal practices involving the use of the word "law" really were 
the linguistic practices that determine the meaning of the word 
"law," it would follow that "law" has a different meaning as one 
moves from one legal system to another. Predictably, Dworkin 
himself sometimes suggests that this is the case.6H But this means he 
has turned his back on his own interpretive theory of meaning and 
adopted the traditional approach. The whole point of his interpre-
tive theory of meaning is that we should not take disagreements 
concerning how the word "law" is used as a reason to think that the 
word is being used with different meanings. Instead, the meaning 
of the word is revealed through critical reflection that seeks to re-
solve these differences. The forum for this critical reflection is the 
language we share with members of other legal systems. 
68 See, e.g., Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 102-04. 
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D. Two Forms of Interpretation Distinguished 
Another reason to believe that Dworkin has conflated linguistic 
and legal practices is his failure to note the very different ways in 
which the two types of practice are reformed through interpreta-
tion. 
Consider Dworkin's example of the practice of courtesy, which 
he believes is analogous to legal practices in its ability to reform it-
self through critical interpretation.69 Such reform occurs when peo-
ple consider the underlying moral purpose of the practice (for ex-
ample, respect) and change the practice in light of that purpose: 
(P]eople begin to demand, under the title of courtesy, forms of 
deference previously unknown or to spurn or refuse forms previ-
ously honored, with no sense of rebellion, claiming that true re-
spect is better served by what they do than by what others did. 
Interpretation folds back into the practice, altering its shape, and 
the new shape encourages further reinterpretation, so the prac-
tice changes dramatically, though each step in the progress is in-
terpretive of what the last achieved.70 
Because the process is interpretive, reformers can legitimately con-
sider past participants to have been bound by rules of courtesy that 
have only now been revealed. This is because the practice is not re-
formed in light of some external moral critique; rather, the moral 
critique is undertaken from the perspective of the practice itselC 
In contrast, people engaging in critical reflection on their linguis-
tic practices do not reform these practices in light of the moral 
purposes animating them. For example, assume that establishing 
valid rules of deductive inference is in fact a form of critical reflec-
tion on the linguistic practices of using terms like "all" and "if ... 
then." It hardly follows that rules of deduction are achieved by re-
flecting on the moral purpose of the practices of using these terms. 
It is not clear that there is such a moral purpose-the purpose of 
69 See id. at 46-49. 
70 ld. at 48. 
7
' For this reason, some moral critiques of practices can fail to be interpretive. Al-
though they may be valid from the moral perspective from which they were under-
taken, if the principles of the moral critique cannot be found within the practice itself, 
the reform will change the practice rather than reveal its inner nature. Dworkin, Tak-
ing Rights Seriously, supra note 1, at 101-05. 
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the practices is instead using the terms in accordance with what 
they really mean. The reason that reform of these practices is in-
terpretive is that any reform (through a discovery of what these 
terms really mean) is undertaken from the perspective of the pre-
reflective commitments of these practices themselves, rather than 
through some contact with allness or if ... thenness. 
Critical reflection on a linguistic practice does not involve reflec-
tion on the moral purposes of the practice, even when the linguistic 
practice is one of using a moral term. Consider Rawls's method of 
reflective equilibrium.72 The method does not proceed by uncover-
ing the moral purpose standing behind our practice of using the 
words "just" and "unjust." Once again, the purpose of this practice 
is simply using the words "just" and "unjust" in accordance with 
their real meanings. There is nothing essentially just (or unjust) 
about this linguistic practice at all. A community could be perfectly 
just and yet not have the linguistic practice (because it has no 
words "just" or "unjust"). Conversely, an unjust community might 
have the linguistic practice-its members could, for example, show 
great facility in describing their atrocities as "unjust" and the acts 
of those they persecuted as "just." The practice of calling things 
"just" and "unjust" does not have a moral purpose the way those 
practices that make a society just have moral purposes.73 What 
makes reform of the practice of using the word "just" interpretive 
is not that one reflects upon its moral purposes, but that any re-
form of the practice is undertaken in light of the prereflective 
commitments of the practice itself. 
The same must hold true of our practice of using the word "law." 
All it means for this practice to be interpretive is that any reform 
(through a discovery of the real meaning of the word-whether 
this real meaning turns out to be conventionalism, interpretive ju-
risprudence, legal realism, or natural law theory) will be under-
taken from the perspective of the prereflective commitments of the 
practice itself. Therefore, there is no reason to assume from the 
application of the interpretive theory of meaning to the word "law" 
that there should be any reflection on the moral purposes of prac-
72 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
73 If the linguistic practice has a moral purpose, it is surely indirect, for example, be-
cause justice itself depends practically upon being able to recognize and describe what 
is just and unjust. 
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tices of the sort that plays a crucial role in Dworkin's theory of law. 
Dworkin thought there was such a connection because he confused 
the linguistic practice of using the word "law" with the specific le-
gal practices, particular to jurisdictions, of adjudicating cases. 
These latter practices, being nonlinguistic, may indeed be like cour-
tesy and thus may be reformed through reflection on their moral 
purposes. But nothing about the interpretive theory of meaning 
tells us that this must occur or, if it does occur, that it is relevant to 
what should be called "law." 
E. Hart's Rule of Recognition is a Legal Rather Than a Linguistic 
Practice 
Dworkin's discussion of his primary jurisprudential rival, H.L.A. 
Hart, offers further evidence that he confuses linguistic and legal 
practices. For Hart, determining what norms should be called 
"law" involves looking for a rule of recognition-that is, a practice 
among officials of enforcing norms only if they satisfy certain crite-
ria.74 A crude example of a rule of recognition is the practice of en-
forcing only those norms inscribed on a particular tablet. If a rule 
of recognition is found, the laws of a jurisdiction are those norms 
that satisfy the criteria of the rule. In our crude example, the law 
would be whatever norms are mentioned on the tablet. 
Hart insists that the rule of recognition is a matter of agreement 
among officials.75 As a consequence, Hart's jurisprudence is con-
ventionalist. No norm is law unless it satisfies criteria generally ac-
cepted by officials. 76 
74 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94 (2d ed. 1994). 
75 Id. at 115-17. Hart in fact had no need to insist that the rule of recognition, under-
stood as a practice, is purely conventional. He could have accepted that it evolves in-
terpretively as Dworkin describes. The conventionalism of the practice constituting 
the rule of recognition is not essential to showing the conventionalism of the law. No 
matter how interpretive the rule of recognition is, the linguistic practice of using the 
word "law" may be such that we call, or should call, "law" only those norms that sat-
isfl. criteria currently accepted by participants in the rule of recognition. 
• The interpretive theory of meaning seems to undermine conventionalist jurispru-
dence at this point. After all, if the interpretive theory of meaning is true, what falls 
under a criterion in the rule of recognition is a question that outstrips the current 
views of its participants. This, it seems, is incompatible with conventionalism. Hart 
and other conventionalists, however, could happily concede that the criteria used in 
the rule of recognition are not exhausted by convention. Consider the crude rule of 
recognition, under which every norm on a particular tablet, and nothing else, is the 
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In keeping with his fallacy, Dworkin assumes that the rule of 
recognition is a linguistic practice of what should be called "law."77 
Given this interpretation, Dworkin's conclusion that Hart suffers 
from the semantic sting makes sense.7H If Hart believes that the rule 
of recognition is a linguistic practice and insists that the norms of 
this practice are exhausted by convergence in opinion, he must 
think that meaning is exhausted by convergence in opinion, which 
is incompatible with nontrivial disagreement over what should be 
called "law." 
The rule of recognition, however, is not a linguistic practice. Av-
erage Americans generally do not participate in the American rule 
of recognition, but they do participate in the practice of using the 
word "law." The same is true of English speakers living in other ju-
risdictions or under conditions of anarchy. According to the inter-
pretive theory of meaning, it is this larger practice that fundamen-
tally determines which norms should be called "law." 
Once it becomes clear that the rule of recognition is not a lin-
guistic practice, Dworkin can no longer argue that Hart suffers 
from the semantic sting. Hart's conventionalism in jurisprudence is 
entirely compatible with anticonventionalism concerning meaning 
(or concepts). Hart could, and probably did, accept that his con-
law. If the interpretive theory of meaning applied to "on the tablet," what was on the 
tablet would not be determined by shared criteria. A norm could be on the tablet 
even though it would not be considered to be on the tablet by the participants in the 
rule of recognition. It should be obvious that this does not get us any closer to 
Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. Even if "on the tablet" is an unfolding interpre-
tive concept, there is no reason to believe that the unfolding occurs through reflection 
upon the underlying moral purposes of legal practices. The reflection that will occur, 
unsurprisingly enough, will be upon what it means for something to be on the tablet. 
Furthermore, applying the interpretive theory of meaning to the criteria employed 
in the rule of recognition is perfectly compatible with jurisprudential conventionalism. 
The conventionalist is not interested in denying the possibility that the scope of "on 
the tablet" might expand or contract through an interpretive process. The point is 
only that "on the tablet" is the criterion for law because of agreement. 
77 E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1658 (2002) (re-
viewing Jules Coleman, A Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach 
to Legal Theory (2001)) ("Hart argued that every legal system necessarily depends on 
a master rule, or 'rule of recognition,' for identifying any and all valid propositions of 
law. This rule exists only because it is accepted (at least by officials) as a matter of 
convention."). The rule of recognition, Dworkin suggests, is used to determine valid 
(or true) propositions of law-such as "The Clean Air Act is law." This makes it a lin-
guistic rule for applying a word (or a rule for applying a concept). 
78 Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
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ventionalist theory of the law was the result of critical reflection 
upon the practice of using the word "law" (or the concept of law ).79 
Like Dworkin, Hart thought that a word could have a stable mean-
ing, or a concept a stable content, even if there was fundamental 
disagreement about its use.~0 
F. Michael Moore and Dworkin's Fallacy 
Dworkin is not the only philosopher of law who misperceives a 
connection between the debate over realism and particular posi-
tions in the philosophy of law. Another is Michael Moore. 
Like Dworkin, Moore takes seriously the view that the meanings 
of words can outstrip current linguistic practices.81 Moore, however, 
adopts a realist rather than an interpretive explanation of this phe-
nomenon: The· meanings of words have constancy, despite changes 
in our criteria for using the words, because of the way the world it-
self is.82 
Moore identifies three types of realism concerning meaning that 
could be relevant to legal theory. In what he calls "first-level" real-
ism, scientific and moral terms refer in a manner that is not de-
pendent upon current linguistic practices.83 As Moore puts it, "it is 
reality, not convention, that fixes the meaning of terms like 'in-
tend,' 'cause,' or 'culpability."'l!4 In the second level, realism is ex-
tended to terms that arise solely in legal contexts, such as "malice." 
These terms too have a meaning that is fixed by something beyond 
agreement about use85-in particular, by functional kinds.86 That a 
79 But see Stavropoulos, supra note 6, at 59 (arguing that the semantic theory Hart 
relied upon was in fact conventionalist). 
80 Hart, supra note 74, at 246 ("[T]he criteria of the application of a concept with a 
constant meaning may both vary and be controversial."). 
81 Moore, supra note 28, at 289-301. 
82 For this reason, Moore insists that Dworkin's interpretive theory of meaning is 
really a form of conventionalism. Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and 
Legality, 60S. Cal. L. Rev. 453, 457-75 (1987) (reviewing Ronald Dworkin, A Matter 
of Principle (1985)). Not surprisingly, Moore claims that Rawls, who uses a similar 
interpretive method, is a conventionalist as well. Moore, supra note 47, at 2446; see 
also Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 8 n.18 (recognizing the difference be-
tween the realisms of Dworkin and Moore). 
83 E.g., Moore, supra note 1, at 882-83; Moore, supra note 28, at 294. 
84 Moore, supra note 1, at 883. 
"
5 1d. at 884-86. 
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thing falls under a functional kind term is not a question of linguis-
tic convention; it is instead a question of whether the thing in fact 
performs the relevant function. 
Moore goes on to argue that a "third-level ... realist will say that 
'law' itself names a functional kind and that general jurisprudence, 
rightly conceived, should study the nature of that kind."87 Moore 
distinguishes this realism about the law from the "legal conven-
tionalist," who 
extracts a concept of law from both ordinary language analysis of 
the linguistic conventions governing the use of the word 'law' and 
from a sociology that describes the conventional legal practices 
of some or all legal systems. Such conventions will exhaust her 
subject, leaving no room for reflection about the nature of the 
thing, law.88 
In the passage quoted immediately above, Moore, like Dworkin, 
identifies conventionalism concerning meaning and conventional-
ism concerning the law. Moore's conventionalist is a conventional-
ist about meaning in the sense that she looks to "linguistic conven-
tions governing the use of the word 'law'" to determine what falls 
under the word, and she is a jurisprudential conventionalist in the 
sense that conventional legal practices will "exhaust her subject." 
By identifying the two, Moore suggests that the failure of conven-
tionalism concerning meaning is a reason to believe that jurispru-
dential conventionalism has also failed. 
If that is in fact Moore's view, he has succumbed to Dworkin's 
fallacy. Let us assume that conventionalism about meaning is in-
deed false-that is, that the meaning of the word "law" is not ex-
86 A functional kind is understood in terms of "the end served by the kind" and "the 
causal relations that exist so that the end is in fact served by the item performing its 
function." Id. at 885-86. Moore insists that realism about functional kinds is as valid 
as first-order realism: "If one is a realist about values and about causal relations, one 
should also be a realist about functional kinds, for belief in their existence is no more 
than an application of one's moral and scientific realism." Id . at 886. The reference of 
a functional kind is determined by two factors: the proper scope of the values the kind 
serves and the proper means of realizing those values. Because these factors are not 
fixed by our current beliefs, what falls under a functional kind can outstrip our current 
criteria for identifying such a kind. 
87 Id. at 887. 
88 Id. at 888. Since identifying functional kinds means identifying proper ends, the 
law has a necessarily moral dimension. Moore, supra note 49, at 188. 
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hausted by linguistic conventions. Indeed, let us assume that this is 
true of all terms. 
One term for which it should be true, as we have seen, is 
"convention." If we hold a realist theory about the meaning of the 
term "convention," the nature of conventions themselves-not our 
shared views about how the term should be used-will determine 
what the term means. Just because we currently disagree about 
whether something should be called a "convention" does not mean 
that there is no fact of the matter about whether it is indeed a con-
vention. We may learn more about conventions over time and 
come to see them where they were not previously visible. It would 
be a mistake, however, to conclude from realist theories of mean-
ing that conventions themselves are not conventions-that their 
norms are not exhausted by agreement. 
Since Moore's realism about meaning is applicable to the term 
"convention" as well as "law," this realism alone gives us no reason 
to believe that "law" is not closer to "convention" in meaning than 
it is to functional kind terms. If so, then it is still entirely possible 
that "conventional legal practices" will "exhaust [the legal theo-
rist's] subject." 
What we learn from Moore's realism about meaning is that the 
meaning of "law" is fixed by LAW out there in the world, not our 
beliefs about law. That, however, does not answer the question of 
what LAW is. Conventions exist in the world, just as much as func-
tional kinds do. By adopting Moore's realism about meaning, we 
have no reason to come to any conclusion about which of those 
things out there in the world law is like. Not surprisingly, we can 
answer this question only by looking at LA W.89 
89 At other times, however, Moore himself warns against confusing conventionalism 
in meaning and conventionalism in jurisprudence, although he argues that it is the 
conventionalists who are confused: 
Often those who adopt the conventionalist line on words like 'law' confuse two differ-
ent ways in which conventions might be relevant to the meaning of 'law.' Such per-
sons often confuse conventions being part of the nature of a thing, on the one hand, 
with our linguistic conventions (concepts) fixing that nature as a matter of analytic 
necessity, on the other. Take the phrase 'coordinated solution,' as it is used by game 
theorists. A coordinated solution is a convention that forms around some salient fea-
ture of a co-ordination problem. But that does not mean that the kind of thing that 
can be a co-ordination solution is fixed by our linguistic conventions (concepts) about 
the correct use of the phrase, 'co-ordination solution.~ We study the nature of co-
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Moore lapses into Dworkin's fallacy because he confuses the 
practice of using the word "law" with legal practices. Since he be-
lieves that the meaning of the word "law" is independent of the 
former type of practice, he falsely concludes that the law is inde-
pendent of the latter. 
To be fair to Moore, however, Dworkin's fallacy arises only oc-
casionally in his works. Indeed, I will argue later that Moore pro-
vides us with examples of philosophy of language that is actually 
relevant to the philosophy of law. But the fact remains that Moore 
cannot use an anticonventionalist theory of meaning to outflank his 
conventionalist opponents in the philosophy of law. To think oth-
erwise is to succumb to Dworkin's fallacy. 
Ill. SECOND QUESTION: CAN WE INTEND TO USE A WORD ONE 
WAY RATHER THAN ANOTHER? 
So far we have been concerned with the impact of the following 
debate on the philosophy of law: Is a word's reference determined 
by currently accepted criteria, or can it be determined by criteria of 
which people are unaware or about which they disagree? The sec-
ond example of a debate that has wrongly been taken to have 
jurisprudential consequences concerns a much more fundamental 
problem: How can people intend to use words one way rather than 
another? 
ordination solutions as a matter of better or worse theory; we do not study them only 
by attending to the concept of co-ordination solution in use in our language. 
Moore, supra note 49, at 205. It is hard to imagine a clearer warning against 
Dworkin's fallacy than this. Indeed, I take advantage of Moore's example in this Es-
say. 
But Moore appears to slip back into Dworkin's fallacy later. The law, he argues, can 
be understood as a nominal kind or as a functional kind. Id. at 206. A nominal kind is 
one whose "only nature is given by the common label attached to its various speci-
mens." ld . If "law" picks out a nominal kind, "[g]eneral jurisprudence would become 
the study of whatever was called 'law' by native speakers of English as they observed 
their own and others' societies." Id. The alternative, he claims, is a conception of the 
Jaw in which its essence is given by its function. Id. at 206-07. But retreating from a 
conventionalist theory of the meaning of "law" does not mean that one must under-
stand the Jaw as a functional kind. The possibility still remains of understanding "law" 
in a manner similar to the way we understand "co-ordinated solution." 
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A. Rule Skepticism 
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,90 Saul Kripke of-
fers a powerful and startling interpretation of Wittgenstein's dis-
cussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations. 91 Kripke 
argues that Wittgenstein responds to a rule skeptic, who questions 
whether an individual can intend to use a term one way rather than 
another-that is, establish a rule with respect to which her subse-
quent use of a term can be correct or incorrect. She cannot estab-
lish such a rule, the rule skeptic argues, because no fact can be 
found that determines what rule she established. 
Kripke first formulates rule skepticism as the following question: 
How can I know that one response rather than another is in accor-
dance with my past intentions? For example, how can I know 
whether "125" is the correct response to the problem "68 + 57 = 
_," given my past understanding of the "+" function? The rule 
skeptic denies that there is any fact that will show that "125," and 
not "5," is in accordance with what I intended. 
The question is not about whether my response is in accordance 
with the laws of mathematics or with societal conventions concern-
ing the proper use of the symbol "+." We want to answer how I 
know that "125" is in accordance with the way I personally in-
tended to use the symbol "+,"even if this intention is idiosyncratic. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of my memory is not in question. Every 
fact available to me when I supposedly intended to use "+" one 
way rather than another is assumed to be fully available to me now. 
Yet, the skeptic argues, none of these facts tells me that I should 
respond with "125" rather than "5." 
Since no fact can be found, the preliminary question gives way to 
the more fundamental question of whether I intended anything at 
all (and whether I can intend anything right now). How can there 
be such intentions if it can never be determined whether I am act-
ing in accordance with them? 
90 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). 
91 Wittgenstein, supra note 9, §§ 143-252. Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein 
has taken on a life of its own, spawning an enormous literature, even though many-
and perhaps most-Wittgenstein scholars reject it as an interpretation of Wittgen-
stein's thought. See Paul A. Boghossian, The Rule-Following Considerations, 98 
Mind 507, 507 (1989). Nothing in this Essay depends upon the validity of Kripke's 
reading of Wittgenstein. 
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To respond to the rule skeptic, it seems we must find something 
that happened as a result of my intention, which, if accurately rec-
ollected, will guide me to the response of "125." This fact will make 
the response "125" appropriate. It is, as Wittgenstein says, "as if 
[the responses] were in some unique way predetermined, antici-
pated-as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality."92 
Simply appealing to my past behavior with respect to the "+" 
function (for example, my responses "2 + 3 = 5" or "5 + 7 = 12") is 
not sufficient. For this behavior is as much in accordance with a bi-
zarre rule for which the outcome is "5" for "68 + 57 = _," as it is 
with a rule for which the outcome is "125." We can call this bizarre 
rule "quus."93 
Kripke next looks at the mental states I had when I first estab-
lished an intention concerning the symbol. He argues that facts of 
this sort must be interpreted in order to suggest anything, and they 
can just as easily be interpreted such that I should respond with "5" 
as "125."94 Certainly this is true for the image of the symbol "+" it-
self, which might have appeared in my mind when I established an 
intention. I can interpret this symbol as suggesting that I respond in 
a quus fashion as easily as a plus fashion. The same, however, can 
be said for any instructions, either given verbally or in images, that 
I might have had at the time. I have to determine what I meant by 
these instructions, and nothing in the instructions themselves will 
favor a plus interpretation over a quus interpretation. 
In short, it seems that any response to "68 + 57 = _" can be sug-
gested by the mental states I had in the past, given the right inter-
pretation. Therefore, no fact about my mental states in the past can 
tell me what I intended. If this is so, then what does it mean to in-
tend something with respect to "+" right now? To say to myself, "I 
know what '+' means to me now, anyway-it means plus," is 
merely to bring into existence another set of indeterminate mental 
states. As Kripke puts it: 
92 Wittgenstein, supra note 9, § 188 . 
• , Of course, taking myself to have meant quus rather than plus is incompatible with 
other rules I take myself to have intended at the time. I cannot have intended "+" to 
mean quus and intended "-" to mean minus, if my rules concerning the relationship 
between the "+" and the "-" symbols were as I currently believe I intended them to 
be. But the rule skeptic can simply apply the skeptical argument to my intentions con-
cerning the"-" symbol and the relationship between the"+" and the "-"symbols. 
94 Kripke, supra note 90, at 11, 19-21. 
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Sometimes when I have contemplated the situation, I have had 
something of an eerie feeling. Even now as I write, I feel confi-
dent that there is something in my mind-the meaning I attach to 
the "plus" sign-that instructs me what I ought to do in all future 
cases .... But when I concentrate on what is now in my mind, 
what instructions can be found there? How can I be said to be 
acting on the basis of these instructions when I act in the fu-
ture? ... What can there be in my mind that I make use of when 
I act in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning van-
ishes into thin air.95 
There is, it seems, no way I can meaningfully suggest to myself that 
I do one thing rather than another.96 
Facts about my mental states fail to answer the rule skeptic be-
cause there is nothing about them that constrains me in any way. 
What about answering the rule skeptic by appealing to what actu-
ally brings me to say "125"? That is, why not appeal to my disposi-
tion to respond with "125?" Intending would not be a mental state, 
but a tendency to act in a certain way. 
The problem with the dispositional account is that it seems to 
follow that I cannot respond improperly. Since my intention is my 
disposition to respond, performance is equated with correctness. 
For example, I hastily perform a calculation and accidentally say 
that "5" rather than "125" is the answer to "68 +57=_." Accord-
ing to the dispositional theory, I will have answered in accordance 
with my intention, since I acted as I was disposed to. 
Of course, one might try to associate my intention with only one 
disposition I have, excluding dispositions to make mistakes. How 
am I to choose which disposition this is, however, unless I antece-
dently know what it is I intended? Such an approach assumes a so-
lution to the very question it was supposed to answer. 
Here is one way of thinking of the problem. Although a disposi-
tion was to act as a constraint upon what I do (it was to be that 
with respect to which what I do could be in error), my choice of 
this disposition is itself something that I do. I must assume that 
95 Id. at 21-22. 
96 Boghossian, supra note 91, at 509-14. For the application of the rule skeptic's ar-
gument to the will, see Michael Steven Green, Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tra-
dition 116-24 (2002). 
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what I do is not in error in order to think that I can correctly 
choose the disposition. If I do make this assumption, I have 
equated performance and correctness again. If I do not, then the 
dispositional account fails. 97 
B. Straight Answers: Platonism and Communitarianism 
The rule skeptic's challenge is as follows: Intending one thing 
rather than another requires a distinction between one's subse-
quent responses seeming to be in accordance with one's intention 
and one's responses actually being in accordance with one's inten-
tion. Dispositional accounts simply equate performance (seeming 
to be right) with correctness (being right). Facts other than one's 
dispositions, such as mental states or past answers, recommend re-
sponses only when given interpretations. Since various interpreta-
tions are possible, one must assume that the interpretation one is 
inclined toward is correct. This means we are simply equating per-
formance and correctness again. 
Some have taken the rule skeptic's argument to recommend a 
form of Platonism about intentions: When one intends something, 
a relationship is established to a special non-natural object-a 
meaning or rule-and it is by virtue of our relation to it that there 
can be a distinction between seeming to be right and being right.98 
Non-natural meanings, unlike mental states or dispositions, carry 
their own interpretations within them, so to speak. This allows 
them to recommend responses, with respect to which one's actual 
responses can be correct or incorrect. The problem with Platonism, 
however, is making sense of how we can have any relationship to 
these meanings, since they appear to stand outside the natural 
world. 99 
97 For an excellent discussion of the dispositional argument, see Boghossian, supra 
note 91, at 527-40. 
'" Id. at 547-48. 
99 Id. at 548-49; cf. Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity, supra note 2, at 
325, 330-34 ("(A]nything that serves as a standard can be variously interpreted. And 
if a standard is amenable to various interpretations, one interpretation must be cho-
sen. But the standard does not tell us which interpretation is the 'correct' one. Thus, 
the very thing (the objective standard) introduced to solve the problem serves only to 
recapitulate the dilemma."). 
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A more common response is that moving from the individual to 
the societal level can reintroduce the distinction between perform-
ance and correctness that is essential to rule-following. 100 What it 
means to act contrary to what I intended is for my actions to be 
checked or resisted by the rest of the community. Let us call this 
approach "communitarian." 
It should be noted at the outset just how odd the communitarian 
approach is. The question it should answer is how I personally can 
intend to respond one way rather than another in connection with 
the symbol "+." It seems strange that what I intended should de-
pend upon how others react to my responses. It is one thing to say 
that the conventional meaning of"+" is dependent upon the com-
munity's responses. If a conventional meaning has been established 
under which"+" means plus, then an individual who intends to use 
"+" in a quus fashion, and who acts in accordance with her inten-
tion, can be considered mistaken vis-a-vis the convention. On the 
other hand, if she acts in a plus fashion, she may be correct vis-a-vis 
the convention, but she would be incorrect vis-a-vis her own inten-
tion. What we are trying to explain is the latter notion-how it is 
that an individual can intend something in connection with "+" so 
that what she does later can be in or out of accordance with her 
own intention. 
Indeed it seems that for there to be a convention, there must be 
a fact of the matter concerning what individuals intend. To say that 
there is a convention under which "+" means plus is to say, inter 
alia, that individual participants in the convention intend "+" to 
mean plus and know that the other participants do so as well. It is 
because of this agreement in individual intentions that a conven-
tion exists. 
Our problem, therefore, is how there can be a fact of the matter 
concerning what individuals intend. The communitarian approach 
to rule-following will claim that these individual intentions-
including idiosyncratic ones that are contrary to conventional 
meanings-are themselves determined by the community's re-
100 Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 14. Patterson calls this approach weak 
anti-realism. For a discussion of such approaches, see Boghossian, supra note 91, at 
519-22. In what Patterson calls "strong" anti-realism, there is no attempt to draw a 
distinction between truth and falsity at all. Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 
15-16. 
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sponses. For example, the fact that I intended something bizarre 
will be determined by the fact that if I respond in a normal way, the 
community will check me. 
A serious problem with the communitarian approach is that we 
seem no less inclined to draw a distinction between seeming to be 
right and being right on the collective level than we do on the indi-
vidual level.'0 ' Let us assume that what it means for an individual 
member of the community to have intended plus rather than quus 
at time t is that when she responds with quus later, she will be 
checked by other members of the community. What happens when 
the dispositions of the community as a whole suddenly go awry, 
and everyone starts responding in a quus fashion? The communi-
tarian must say that what she intended at time t suddenly changed 
from plus to quus. That seems wrong. With respect to the commu-
nity, as with the individual, we draw a distinction between per-
formance and correctness. 
C. Rule-following, Meaning, and Truth 
It should be evident that the rule skeptic's problem is much 
more fundamental than the problem addressed in Part I. If the rule 
skeptic is right, then no theory offered in Part I can be correct. If 
neither individuals nor communities can intend to do one thing 
rather than another in connection with a word, then the meaning of 
a word-however it might be characterized-is impossible. 102 In-
deed, the rule skeptic's argument is a broadside attack on the very 
idea that we are intentional beings at all.' 03 If the rule skeptic is 
right, we are nothing but automata, moving our limbs randomly 
and barking out gibberish. 
101 Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 15 ("[l)t seems that the community 
can never say anything that is not true .... What if the entire community agrees that 
the earth is flat? Or that 2 + 2 = 6? Is the community correct? Are these 'truths'?"). 
102 All of the approaches in Part I assume that intentions are possible. For example, 
for Moore's realist, these intentions are necessary to determine the paradigm samples 
whose underlying natures fix the reference of words. If no one can intend one thing 
rather than another, then neither individuals nor a community can pick out paradigm 
samples. Likewise, in Dworkin's interpretive theory of meaning, reflection on linguis-
tic practices cannot occur if there are no initial intentions concerning the use of words 
upon which to reflect. 
103 Boghossian, supra note 91, at 509-14. 
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The rule skeptic's attack on linguistic meaning is also an attack 
on the possibility of our judgments or sentences being true (or 
false). If words can have no meaning, then "cat" and "mat" are no 
different from "kfeajwgv" and "hhhhh." If so, then, "The cat is on 
the mat" can be no more true or false when uttered than, "The 
kfeajwgv is on the hhhhh." 
If one adopts a Platonist solution to the rule skeptic's problem, 
however, any of the accounts of a word's meaning in Part I will 
probably be viable. For example, let us assume that the traditional 
theory is correct and that a word's meaning is dependent upon the 
community's current criteria for using the word. These criteria are 
the result of a convergence of individual intentions concerning 
proper use of the word. What these individual intentions are, under 
the Platonist approach, is a question of relationships between these 
individuals and the Platonic meanings they intend. Therefore, al-
though the Platonist response to rule skepticism is "realist" in a 
sense, since individual intention is not a matter of community re-
sponse, it is compatible with the traditionalist's conventionalism 
about the meanings of words. 
Conversely, let us assume that the realist theory is correct and 
that the meanings of words will depend solely on the structures of 
the paradigm samples identified through the first uses of the words. 
Which paradigm samples were first identified is a question of indi-
viduals' intentions concerning the use of the words. For the Plato-
nist, that will be a question of relationships between individuals 
and Platonic entities. 
If one adopts a communitarian solution to the rule skeptic's 
problem, however, none of the theories of meaning spelled out in 
Part I will look the same. All of the theories in Part I depend upon 
the existence of individual intentions. If these intentions are estab-
lished, not by individuals, but by community responses, then, in a 
fundamental sense, the meaning of words-however it is character-
ized by the theories in Part I-will always be a question of commu-
nity responses. 
Furthermore, since meaning is connected to truth, there will be 
an important sense in which, for the communitarian, a sentence's 
truth is determined by how the community responds when the sen-
tence is uttered. This is a far stronger (and stranger) claim than the 
traditionalist's view that certain analytic sentences (such as, "A 
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bachelor is an unmarried male") are true by community agree-
ment. Even sentences that the traditionalist would consider to be 
determined by the nature of the world (such as, "Bachelors tend 
not to have full sets of cookware") will be true by virtue of shared 
responses. This is because the meanings of words like "bachelor" 
or "cookware" will be essentially determined by such responses. 
D. Dennis Patterson's Dissolution of the Rule Skeptic's Problem 
Dennis Patterson has offered a comprehensive attack on the two 
types of response to the rule skeptic's problem outlined above, 
which he calls "realism" and "anti-realism."104 Patterson argues that 
both the realist and the anti-realist hold a "modernist" view about 
meaning, according to which the rule skeptic's worries about mean-
ing must be answered. "Despite their differences, both the realist 
and the anti-realist claim that the meaning of our propositions 
comes from somewhere; the disagreement is not over the question 
of how there is meaning, only of its source: the world (realism) or 
104 As we have seen, see supra Section III.C, the communitarian solution to the rule 
skeptic's problem in the end makes not merely the content of individual intentions 
but also the meaning and truth of sentences in public languages a question of commu-
nity responses. Undoubtedly for this reason, Patterson tends to speak of "anti-
realism" simply as the view that meaning and truth in public languages are questions 
of agreement. E.g., Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 12-14, 165 & n.57. This 
makes it easy to think that Patterson's anti-realist is simply an advocate of the tradi-
tional theory of meaning, described in Part 1. This impression is reinforced by his ten-
dency to speak of Moore's theory of meaning, which is primarily a critique of the tra-
ditional theory, as an example of "realism." E.g., id. at 44; Dennis Patterson, 
Conscience and the Constitution, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 270, 288-89 (1993) (reviewing 
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991)). 
Patterson's anti-realist thinks that meaning and truth are matters of agreement in a 
much stronger sense than the traditionalist. All sentences, not merely analytic sen-
tences like "A bachelor is an unmarried male," are true by virtue of agreement. In-
deed, I have argued that both Moore and the traditionalist must reject anti-realism in 
Patterson's sense of the term, because both assume the possibility of individual inten-
tions to use words that do not depend upon community responses. See supra Section 
III.C. It appears that Patterson treats Moore's realism not merely as a rejection of 
traditionalism, but also as a distinctive theory of individual intentions (in which the 
world provides the Platonic entities that give our intentions content), because Patter-
son thinks Moore himself understood his theory that way. Dennis Patterson, Norma-
tivity and Objectivity, supra note 2, at 325, 331-33. Although Patterson may be right 
in his reading of Moore, see Moore, supra note 1, at 900-01; Moore, supra note 47, at 
2495, we should keep in mind that a Pattersonian realist need not hold Moore's the-
ory of meaning. He could instead be a traditionalist about meaning. 
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conventional criteria (anti-realism)." 105 Modernism about meaning 
also expresses itself in the desire to spell out the conditions under 
which our sentences are true: 
For realists, a proposition is true in virtue of some feature of the 
empirical, conceptual, or normative realm that makes it true .... 
The anti-realist opposes the realist picture of truth with a variety 
of alternative pictures. For example, conventionalists assert that 
there are no features of the world that make propositions true or 
false. Rather, truth and falsity are a function of agreement 
• • • • • 106 among partlctpants m a gtven practice. 
In contrast, Wittgenstein's approach, according to Patterson, is 
postmodernist: 
The reason the later Wittgenstein's approach to language is so 
revolutionary is the fact that his attack on modernist philosophi-
cal methods breaks down the distinction between explanation 
and the phenomenon to be explained. All understanding occurs 
in language . . . . [ t ]he idea of language "corresponding" with 
something outside itself can never be cashed out because all talk 
about language is still use of language: no part of language can be 
torn apart from the whole and valorized as a "metalanguage," a 
superlanguage or "language about language." 107 
Rule skepticism is generated by the concern that any source of 
meaning can be interpreted in various ways. Yet, "interpretation is 
of necessity a secondary endeavor; the very existence of practices 
of interpretation is dependent upon understanding already being in 
place."108 Therefore, rule skepticism need not, and indeed should 
not, be answered. To try to answer it is to try to take a position 
with respect to language that we cannot occupy. 
Although Patterson emphasizes that the language we inhabit 
depends upon shared responses by members of the linguistic com-
munity, he disagrees with the anti-realist, who seeks to explain why 
one interpretation is correct rather than another by reference to 
these shared responses. Instead, Patterson argues, it is only in the 
oos Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 167. 
'
06 Id . at 165. 
'"' Id . at 162. 
'
08 Id . at 127. 
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context of the shared responses that various interpretations of a 
rule can be entertained. As a result, skepticism about meaning 
cannot get off the ground. 109 
Once again, I am not concerned with whether Patterson has in 
fact solved (or dissolved) the rule skeptic's problem or whether he 
has offered an adequate account of the later Wittgenstein. Let us 
assume that everything Patterson has said so far is correct. Our 
question is whether the debate between realists, anti-realists, and 
postmodernists has any consequences for the philosophy of law. 
IV. DOES THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND QUESTION MATTER TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW? 
A. Patterson and Dworkin's Fallacy 
Patterson clearly thinks that it does.ll0 In keeping with this as-
sumption, he offers his own postmodernist jurisprudential theory, 
which he believes follows from his postmodernist theory (or anti-
theory) of meaning. According to the theory of meaning, knowl-
edge is not "the grasp of a relation (truth condition) between word 
and object; rather, knowledge will be unpacked in terms of linguis-
tic competence, facility in the languages of man."ll 1 All determina-
tion of meaning is already undertaken in the context of linguistic 
practices. Patterson then takes this theory of meaning to justify a 
theory of the law, under which the law depends upon participants 
having facility in practices of legal argument. Lawyers, he notes, 
"have no difficulty in teaching for the forms of argument to show 
the truth of propositions of law. The practice of law is conducted in 
the language of the forms: without them there is no law."ll2 
109 For the argument that Patterson is indeed an anti-realist, see Leiter, supra note 1, 
at1739,1743-45. 
110 E.g., Patterson, Law and Truth, supra note 1, at 4. It is not surprising therefore 
that Patterson's critique of Dworkin does not question Dworkin's conviction that 
there is a relationship between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of law. 
Id. at 6-11. Instead, Patterson argues against Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence by 
arguing that his interpretive theory of meaning is disguised modernism. Similarly, Pat-
terson argues against Moore's realist jurisprudence by revealing the modernism 
standing behind his realist theory of meaning. 
"' Id. at 169. 
112 Id. at 178. 
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This is Dworkin's fallacy all over again. Once again, the best 
place to start is by considering a word other than "law," like 
"gold." 
How is it that the word "gold" can have a meaning? The rule 
skeptic questions the ability of an individual or group to establish 
an intention with respect to which subsequent uses of the word 
"gold" can be correct or incorrect. To be sure, we think that "gold" 
should be applied to heavy, yellow, ductile metals, but alternative 
interpretations are possible. Perhaps we intended it to refer to 
Nilla Wafers. Nothing can be found to constrain us such that 
"gold" should be applied to the former and not the latter. Accord-
ing to Patterson's theory of meaning, this question of what gives 
"gold" meaning is improper because it is posed independently of 
language. We cannot even begin to offer interpretations of the 
meaning of the word "gold" without participating in our linguistic 
practices concerning the word. 
Let us assume that Patterson is right. It would nevertheless be a 
serious mistake to draw a theory of gold from this theory (or anti-
theory) of how "gold" gets meaning-for example, a theory under 
which gold itself exists only because people have facility with cer-
tain argumentative practices. Adopting Patterson's antitheory of 
the meaning of the word "gold" means setting aside rule skepticism 
and participating in the practice of using the word "gold." Such 
participation means speaking of gold as a heavy, yellow, ductile 
metal, not as something constituted by argumentative practices. 
Indeed, a postmodernist theory of gold is contrary to the postmod-
ernist theory of meaning, because it would involve acting in a way 
that is contrary to our linguistic practices concerning the word 
"gold." 
Patterson's argument makes the same mistake-he derives a 
postmodernist theory of the law from a postmodernist theory of 
the meaning of the word "law." 113 All that follows from his post-
modernist theory of meaning is that any discussion of the meaning 
of "law" must set aside rule skepticism and situate itself within the 
framework of our practices concerning the use of the word "law." 
The very fact that there is controversy about what the law is, how-
IIJ This problem with Patterson's legal theory is identified in Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1679,1694,1708-09 (1997). 
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ever, means that participating in these practices only starts the de-
bate about the law. It does not answer the debate. We can use Pat-
terson's theory to respond to the rule skeptic who questions 
whether the word "law" refers to Nilla Wafers. Such skeptical 
questions occupy a position outside language. But once one re-
enters language, there is still a debate between conventionalists, in-
terpretivists, legal realists, and natural law theorists. None of these 
positions is outside language. Patterson cannot use his views in the 
philosophy of language, no matter how plausible they might be, to 
defeat his opponents in the philosophy of law. 
As with Dworkin and Moore, Patterson succumbs to Dworkin's 
fallacy because he fails to distinguish linguistic practices from legal 
practices. Consider the differences between the communities at is-
sue in his theory of the meaning of the word "law" and in his the-
ory of the law. The community that one re-enters, after having set 
aside rule skepticism with regard to the word "law," is comprehen-
sive and consists potentially of all English speakers or even all ra-
tional beings. This community includes people living in conditions 
of anarchy and people participating in a multitude of different legal 
systems. In contrast, the community with facility in forms of argu-
ment upon which the existence of the law depends under Patter-
son's jurisprudential theory is a community (presumably consisting 
of lawyers, judges, and other officials) particular to a jurisdiction. 
Patterson misconcludes from the fact that the meaning of the 
word "law" requires participation in the first sort of practice that 
the law depends upon participation in the second sort of practice. 
The truth is that when we, as participants in the first sort of prac-
tice, immerse ourselves in it, we may conclude that the law is not a 
question of participation in the second practice. We may, for ex-
ample, conclude with the classical natural law theorist that the law 
is a question of conformity with independent moral requirements. 
Of course, many people are inclined to think that the law exists 
whenever a group of people within a jurisdiction have facility in the 
use of certain forms of argument involving the word "law."114 They 
are inclined to accept this view, however, precisely because the lin-
guistic community as a whole tends toward a conventionalist the-
ory of the law, under which agreement, in a particular jurisdiction, 
114 See Leiter, supra note 1, at 1742-43. 
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that a norm should be called "law" is a reason for all of us to call it 
"law." 115 I believe Patterson's jurisprudential theory is indeed con-
ventionalist. It is not necessary, however, to argue that here. What-
ever Patterson's jurisprudential theory is, he cannot argue for it on 
the basis of a theory (or anti theory) about meaning. 
B. The Anti-realists and Dworkin's Fallacy 
Patterson is far from being the only person to misderive juris-
prudential theories from philosophical responses to rule skepti-
cism. It is common for Patterson's "anti-realists"-those who claim 
that rule-following is possible only because of community agree-
ment-to conclude that the law itself is constituted in some sense 
by community agreement. 
Margaret Radin provides a good example. 116 She begins with 
what she calls Wittgenstein's "social practice conception [of rules] 
in which agreement in responsive action is the primary mark of the 
existence of a rule." 117 From this she argues that a conception of le-
gal rules follows. A legal rule "would cease to exist if we (the rele-
vant community) stopped apprehending it as a rule and stopped 
recognizing ourselves and others as acting under it." 118 
Radin's theory of law is conventionalist. She argues that the exis-
tence of a legal rule is a question of convergence of belief and ac-
tion within a particular community. Nothing about this theory of 
law, however, follows from the social practice conception of rules 
that she attributes to Wittgenstein. Let us assume that she is cor-
rect that "agreement in responsive action is the primary mark of 
the existence of a rule." 119 Understood as a response to rule skepti-
cism, Radin must mean the following: What it is for me to intend to 
use"+" in a plus rather than quus fashion is for people to check my 
quus-like behavior. This fact will be relevant to the meaning of 
words in public language as well-no matter how that meaning is 
conceived. In some sense, the meaning of the word "law" will be a 
matter of how people check one another when using the word. 
115 See Zipursky, supra note 113, at 1707-13. 
116 See Radin, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
117 Radin, supra note 2, at 798--801. 
118 Id. at 807 . 
119 Id . at 798. 
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Nothing about this conception of rules, however, tells us how 
people will check one another. Perhaps anyone who offers Radin's 
conventionalist theory of the law will be met with general resis-
tance, and those who offer a natural law theory will be accepted 
with open arms. If so, then under Radin's own theory of meaning 
her theory of law will be false. Radin, too, has fallen prey to 
Dworkin's fallacy. 120 
CONCLUSION: THE RELEVANCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
Given the prevalence of Dworkin's fallacy, the conviction that 
the philosophy of law can be usefully illuminated by issues in the 
philosophy of language should be seriously questioned. I believe 
that the influence of the philosophy of language on the philosophy 
of law has been largely negative. Philosophers of law would have 
been better off if the philosophy of language had been set aside en-
tirely. 
This is particularly true of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-
following. Although rule skepticism is a very important problem in 
the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, this impor-
tance is the very reason that it is irrelevant to the philosophy of 
law. The rule skeptic's argument is important because it undercuts 
the idea that we are intentional beings. The law is the least of our 
worries if the rule skeptic cannot be answered. Our primary con-
cern should be that everything we do and say is meaningless. 
Furthermore, if the rule skeptic can be answered, that answer 
will simply reintroduce human intentionality. This is a prerequisite 
120 Radin makes this mistake not merely because of Dworkin's fallacy, but also be-
cause she is confused about the "rules" that are at issue for Wittgenstein. Wittgen-
stein is concerned about our ability to establish personal intentions to respond one 
way rather than another in the future. Given this understanding of "rule," the com-
munitarian position is startling: The content of our personal intentions is determined 
by how others respond to us. Radin appears to treat "rules" not as personal inten-
tions, but as public conventions. So understood, the view, which she attributes to 
Wittgenstein, that "agreement in responsive action is the primary mark of the exis-
tence of a rule," id. at 798-801, is anything but startling. Public conventions clearly 
require agreement in responsive action. Having misunderstood Wittgenstein's "rules" 
as public conventions, Radin then argues that legal "rules" must be public conven-
tions as well. 
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for many things we hold dear, including law, but its reintroduction 
does not cut one way or another concerning particular theories of 
the law. 121 
I cannot, however, make a categorical claim about the irrele-
vance of those positions that were explored in Part I. Rather, I will 
identify three circumstances where those positions can indeed be 
relevant to jurisprudential concerns. 
A. Questions of Jurisprudential Method 
If someone purports to give a theory of the law, it is not unrea-
sonable to demand an account of what method she employs when 
doing so. Is she engaging in empirical inquiry, whether scientific, 
psychological or sociological? Or is she engaging in inquiry into the 
meaning of the word "law" (or the concept of law)? If it is the lat-
ter, what is her response to arguments that the purported analysis 
of meanings (or concepts) cannot occur?122 There are a number of 
121 Brian Bix, The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein's Rule-
Following Considerations to Legal Theory, in Wittgenstein and Legal Theory, supra 
note 2, at 209, 211-12; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, 
and Authority, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 570-72 (1993); Christopher L. Kutz, Just Dis-
agreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 Yale L.J. 997, 
1008-12 (1994). 
122 Another reason to question the possibility of the analysis of meanings is Quine's 
famous attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." 
W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 Phil. Rev. 20, 20-34 (1951); see, e.g., 
Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, 
in Hart's Postscript, supra note 6, at 355, 357. Since this attack, it has been common 
for philosophers to at least pay lip service to the idea that analytic truth, even in its 
cluster version, cannot exist. But in fact this is usually just lip service, because many 
philosophers refuse to accept a basic premise for Quine's argument-and for good 
reason. 
Quine attacks analyticity by attacking the idea of synonymy-that is, sameness of 
meaning. Quine, supra, at 20-34 . If "unmarried male" is a complete analysis of the 
meaning of "bachelor," then "bachelor" and "unmarried male" are synonymous. But 
Quine's argument against synonymy is intimately tied to his view about the radical 
indeterminacy of meaning generally, and philosophers are less likely to accept 
Quine's indeterminacy thesis. E.g., Lycan, supra note 4, at 126; Paul Boghossian, 
Analyticity Reconsidered, 30 Nous 360, 360-61 (1996); William G. Lycan, Definition 
in a Quinean World, in Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives 111, 
111 (J.H. Fetzer eta!. eds., 1991). 
If philosophers accept that there is such a thing as linguistic items having determi-
nate meanings (even if these meanings are clustery) and that we can know these 
meanings, it seems odd to say that it would be impossible for us to know that two 
items have the same meaning. See Boghossian, supra, at 370-71 ("Could there be a 
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philosophers of law who are interested in these issues of jurispru-
dential method. For this reason, they appropriately spend time ad-
dressing issues in the philosophy of language. 123 
It is important to remember, however, that simply because the 
philosophy of language is relevant to questions of jurisprudential 
method is not a reason to believe that it can tell us what the out-
come of the method will be. Imagine that someone has adequately 
defended the traditional method of analyzing meanings. It would 
be perfectly compatible with this method for her to present 
Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence, or Hart's conventionalism, 
or legal realism, or natural law theory. Any of these could be the 
product of the analysis of the conventional meaning of the word 
"law." The same thing can be true of a philosopher of law who 
adequately defended a realist or an interpretive method. The phi-
losophy of language can tell us what philosophers of law are doing 
when they give a theory of the law-but that is a far cry from giv-
ing us a theory of law itself. 
B. Blocking or Unblocking Theories of Law 
Philosophers of language have the power, or believe they have 
the power, to show that certain areas of discourse or methods of 
argument are philosophically suspect. Consider the verificationist 
theory of meaning offered by the logical positivists-that is, the 
theory that the meaning of a term consists of the conditions under 
which the application of the term can be empirically verified. 124 
fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about 
whether they mean the same?"). If the items have the same meaning, then we would 
know they have the same meaning simply by knowing what their meanings were. The 
only way of preserving Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction would be 
to argue that, in fact, no two items in English or any other language have the same 
meaning. But how could Quine or anyone know this about the items of natural lan-
guages in advance of investigating the languages themselves? Indeed, it would appear 
that our knowledge that two occurrences of the same word-e.g. "green" and 
"green"-are synonymous, shows that Quine is wrong. Boghossian, supra, at 372. If 
meaning were indeterminate, we could not know that this was true. 
12
"' See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 58, at 151-217 (defending the possibility of concep-
tual analysis in jurisprudence); Leiter, supra note 122 (critiquing the idea of concep-
tual analysis). 
124 E .g., Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1952); Carl G. Hempel, Em-
piricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes, in Aspects of Scien-
tific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science 101, 109 (1965). 
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Verificationism casts doubt upon the meaningfulness of ethical 
language, as well as language about abstract objects. 
If a jurisprudential theory explains what the law is by using 
words or methods upon which a philosophy of language has cast 
doubt, then the truth or falsity of that philosophy of language will 
clearly make a difference to the viability of the theory of the law. 
For example, verificationism gives us reason to doubt natural law 
theories, under which the law has a necessarily moral element, as 
well as Kelsen's pure theory of law, in which legal norms are un-
derstood as abstract objects that cannot be observed empirically.125 
By the same token, a philosophy of law that rescues areas of dis-
course or methods of explanation can be relevant to the philosophy 
of law by unblocking a previously blocked theory of law.'26 Much of 
Michael Moore's discussion of the philosophy of language has this 
character. Moore is a strong defender of a realist account of the 
meaning of moral terms. 127 This discussion of the philosophy of lan-
guage is relevant to his jurisprudential concerns. If law is a func-
tional kind, the scope of the law is determined in part by the 
proper scope of the moral ends the law serves. Such an account is 
viable, however, only if we can discuss these moral ends. Moore 
uses the philosophy of language to show how this is possible. 
For the same reason, Kelsen undertakes lengthy defenses of the 
meaningfulness of discourse about abstract legal objects and of our 
ability to know these objects.128 These excursions into the philoso-
m Brian Leiter has argued that naturalism supports a legal realist approach in the 
philosophy of law, since legal realism is naturalist in method. Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267 (1997). This 
is an example of a philosophy of law being supported by blocking alternatives. Cole-
man and Simchen likewise argue that their metasemantic theory of how the "law" re-
fers "imposes constraints on what can count as a plausible answer to various jurispru-
dential questions." Coleman & Simchen, supra note 12, at 12. Because the word "law" 
(like the word "pebble") is not one whose reference is fixed by reliance upon those 
with expertise, Dworkin's theory of the law cannot be correct. For Dworkin's theory 
is one in which the reference of the word "law" is determined by the eventual devel-
opment of high theory about the law. Id. at 25-28. 
126 See Zipursky, supra note 113, at 1682-1706. 
127 E.g. Moore, supra note 47, at 2424. 
128 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory 9 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992) (defending the view that legal 
norms cannot be observed through the senses). For a discussion of Kelsen's argument, 
see Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 Ala. L. 
Rev. 365, 381-405 (2003). 
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phy of language and epistemology are necessary in the face of gen-
eral doubts about abstract objects. 
It is important to note, however, that the philosophy of language 
can do nothing to show that one unblocked theory (for example, 
Moore's) is better than another unblocked theory (for example, 
Kelsen's) or is better than a theory that has not been threatened 
with blockage (for example, .conventionalism or legal realism). 
Once again, the philosophy of language cannot provide us with a 
theory of the law. 
C. Interpreting Legal Texts 
Authoritative sources of law (for example, constitutions, stat-
utes, regulations and judicial decisions) invariably contain lan-
guage, and this language must be interpreted, both by officials who 
seek to enforce the law and by individuals who seek to conform 
their behavior to its requirements. The philosophy of language can 
be relevant to determining the scope of reasonable interpretation. 
For example, if the traditional approach to meaning is correct, it 
would appear to follow that the author of a legal text who used the 
word "gold" could not refer to something other than what satisfied 
her, or her linguistic community's, current criteria for using the 
word. On the other hand, if a realist or interpretive theory of 
meaning is correct, broader reference would be possible. Michael 
Moore and David Brink are examples of philosophers of law who 
use realist theories of meaning to argue for forms of interpretation 
that do not slavishly follow the narrow beliefs of the texts' au-
thors.129 This is an example of how the philosophy of language can 
have an impact on the philosophy of law. 
I doubt, however, whether different theories of meaning can 
have much of an impact on our theories of how legal texts should 
be interpreted, for two reasons. First, even though interpretive and 
realist theories of meaning expand the referential capacities of our 
language beyond what is allowed under the traditional approach, 
they do not make meaning and reference, as the traditionalist de-
scribes them, impossible. We may use words in a manner solely in-
129 Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 
119-24; Moore, supra note 1, at 882-83; Moore, supra note 28, at 294. 
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tended to pick out what satisfies the currently accepted criteria as-
sociated with the word. Consider, for example, a constitutional 
amendment that obligates the United States to maintain a gold 
standard. As the word "gold" is used in that amendment, it is en-
tirely possible that it is not meant to pick out GOLD-that is, what 
in fact falls under the word (as determined by interpretive or realist 
theories of meaning)-but simply the stuff that satisfies current cri-
teria for the use of the word "gold." If we discover that tens of mil-
lions of tons of some worthless metallic substance has the same 
structure as the stuff we call "gold," the authors of the amendment 
may want us to conclude that "gold," as it was used in the amend-
ment, does not apply to the worthless metal, despite the fact that it 
is GOLD. 
Second, authorial intent aside, what counts as an appropriate or 
inappropriate interpretation of texts is often itself a question of 
law. Even though "gold" in the amendment might have been in-
tended by its drafters to refer to GOLD, it may simply be the law 
that, when interpreting the amendment, one should look only to 
the narrow conception of "gold" possessed by the drafters. Indeed, 
there may be a statute or constitutional amendment that says, "Do 
not use interpretive or realist theories of meaning when interpret-
ing legal texts!" One reason for this rule may be that such a limita-
tion on interpretation brings with it predictability. 
Since the appropriate interpretation of legal texts is itself a legal 
question, it is difficult to see how it is a question in the philosophy 
of law at all. If interpretive or realist theories have an influence on 
the interpretation of legal texts , it will only be because the law of a 
jurisdiction permits it. 130 
Setting these worries aside, Dworkin's fallacy remains a fallacy 
no matter how relevant the philosophy of language is to the inter-
pretation of legal texts. One must have already answered (if only 
unreflectively) the question of what the law is before one can know 
that a text is authoritative. Which texts are relevant may vary given 
a conventionalist, interpretive, legal realist, or natural law theory. 
And the philosophy of language, as we have seen, is almost entirely 
irrelevant to this more fundamental question of what the law is. 
'
30 See Brian Bix, Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of 
Legal Determinacy?, 16 Ratio Juris 281,286-92 (2003). 
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This more fundamental question can be answered, not by the phi-
losophy of language, but by the philosophy of law. 
